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 Belief perseverance – the tendency for people to maintain an initial belief even after the 
foundation for that belief has been discredited – has been documented in relation to a variety of 
topics (e.g., capital punishment, celebrities, politics; Bui, 2014; Carretta & Moreland, 1982; 
Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), but has yet to be evaluated in relation to weight stigma, one of the 
most prevalent forms of social disgrace (Tomiyama, 2019). Research on belief perseverance has 
typically utilized the debriefing paradigm, which involves distributing opposing information to 
two groups of participants before discrediting said information and asking participants to make a 
related judgment. Such studies have focused on explicit beliefs and have mainly been conducted 
within a single experimental session (e.g., Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). This study expands 
upon belief perseverance theory and methods by evaluating the potential moderating role of 
existing (i.e., implicit) weight-stigma beliefs within the standard debriefing paradigm in addition 
to the inclusion of a prospectively measured follow-up assessment while also examining the 
possible moderating effects of confirmation bias and anchoring. Participants read a report, which 
informed them of either a negative or positive correlation between weight and aggression in 
young adults, before learning that the information provided to them was falsified and randomly 
assigned. Participants then immediately completed explicit and implicit measures regarding their 
views on weight, followed by surveys to assess demographics and their level of anchoring, 
response bias, and confirmation bias. Two days later, participants completed the explicit and 
implicit measures a second time. Results revealed (1) that belief perseverance did replicate to 
views on weight, (2) that implicit beliefs about weight did not moderate explicit beliefs, (3) that 
neither confirmation bias nor anchoring moderated explicit beliefs, and (4) that these findings 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Kathleen is convinced that the childhood vaccinations her son received led to his later  
diagnosis of autism. Luckily for Kathleen, her daughter Susan is well-versed on the vaccine 
literature. Susan explains that the initial study conducted on the link between vaccinations and 
autism was illegitimate as the main author was in the midst of developing his own vaccine. 
Moreover, no other studies were ever able to replicate the findings and the initial study has since 
been retracted. Susan goes on to explain that vaccinations happen to occur at the same time in the 
life of a child that autistic symptoms start to present themselves and that this is why people can 
mistakenly believe that one leads to the other. Despite having these facts presented and explained 
in detail, Kathleen continues to believe in the link between vaccinations and autism. 
 It is likely that we have all experienced similar situations in which we offer what seems 
to be overwhelming evidence opposing the beliefs of others only to find that their views have 
barely shifted, if at all. In fact, we ourselves are likely to have been similarly entrenched in our 
own views on more than one occasion. In psychological terms this is known as belief 
perseverance – a cognitive bias where an individual continues to maintain a belief even after the 
foundation for that belief has been discredited (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). Previous 
research has examined belief perseverance in a number of domains including beliefs regarding 
capital punishment, attitudes towards celebrities, and even judgments about a suspect’s guilt 
(Bui, 2014; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; More, Madon, Guyll, & Atkinson, 2016).  
 Despite the number of past studies, research examining belief perseverance has focused 
primarily on explicit outcomes that are measured using self-report. Given the predictive power 
that implicit beliefs exhibit in relation to topics such as body satisfaction, dieting, and physical 




beliefs in relation to belief perseverance (Glashouwer, Bennik, de Jong, & Spruyt, 2018; Gómez-
López, Manzano-Sánchez, Merino-Barrero, & Valero-Valenzuela, 2019; Heider, Spruyt, & De 
Houwer, 2018). This may be especially true regarding topics that have associated biases, such as 
weight, as the predictive power of self-report measures can be impaired when dealing with 
socially sensitive topics (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Specifically, when 
the topic is likely to lead individuals to respond in a socially desirable manner, it can result in 
implicit measures exhibiting greater predictive validity than explicit measures.   
 Additionally, studies on belief perseverance have been primarily focused on short-term 
effects. This line of research predominantly involves a brief manipulation followed by an 
assessment with no further follow-up (e.g., More et al., 2016; Ross et al., 1975). Contrary to this 
tendency, one study examined the impact of belief perseverance immediately after an 
experimental manipulation and at a one-week follow up (Anderson, 1983). Results indicated that 
belief perseverance effects were still present one week after receiving false information. 
However, it remains unknown whether any possible moderating effects of implicit beliefs exist 
and whether any such effects persist beyond the limited scope of a single, brief experimental 
session. Therefore, an examination of such effects over a longer time period would be beneficial 
as it would illuminate whether they are fleeting or more longer lasting.  
 Another unique contribution of the present research is to extend belief perseverance to 
stigma – the social rejection that accompanies individuals who do not align with social norms 
(Goffman, 1963). The presence of stigma is centuries old, but over the years it has come to 
represent any form of social disgrace, such as weight stigma, which presently serves as one of 
the most widespread stigmata (Tomiyama et al., 2018). A better understanding of the role that 




weight of others has numerous detrimental effects. For example, previous research has 
documented that internalizing social attitudes regarding weight stigma can lead to the avoidance 
of exercise (Vartanian & Novak, 2011) and an increase in caloric intake, which thereby 
exacerbates the amount of stigma an individual may encounter (Schvey, Puhl, & Brown, 2011). 
Moreover, obese patients tend to receive poorer quality health care (Phelan et al., 2015) and, not 
surprisingly, individuals that are subject to weight stigma have increased risk of adverse 
psychological outcomes such as depression (Wu & Berry, 2018). 
 Although past research has examined belief perseverance, its effect related to weight 
stigma has yet to be examined. Moreover, the mechanisms and persistence of such effects have 
yet to be fully elucidated. Based on these important unanswered questions, the overall goal of the 
present research was to better understand the impact, mechanisms, and staying power of belief 
perseverance. With this goal in mind, the pertinent literature is examined below. Specifically, the 
history in psychology regarding biases and heuristics involved in the decision-making process 
that may ultimately lead to belief perseverance is reported. A review of belief perseverance as 
well as explicit and implicit beliefs then follows. Finally, an examination of the literature on 
stigma is presented, particularly that of weight stigma. Based on the literature, a study was 
designed to examine whether the belief perseverance effect replicates to views related to weight 
and aggression, whether implicit beliefs about weight or the tendency to fall prey to cognitive 
biases moderate such belief perseverance effects, and whether any such effects persist beyond 
their initial conception. 
  Bias 
 Human perception is not infallible. In fact, psychologists have highlighted the impact that 




researchers suggested that the manner in which we perceive stimuli is shackled to the internal 
events of our own expectations, attitudes, and needs (Erdelyi, 1974). Over time, this perspective 
became known as the New Look (Bruner, 1992). In one of the earliest studies in this field, 
participants were asked to adjust the size of a variable circular patch of light controlled by a knob 
until they believed it was equal in size to a plastic disc during four within-subject experimental 
conditions (Bruner & Postman, 1947). Participants first adjusted the light normally and then 
received mild electric shocks followed by strong electric shocks. Finally, during the fourth 
condition, no shocks were administered. Results showed that as the shocks increased in severity, 
participants became better at matching the light to the disc. However, participants significantly 
overestimated the size of the disc once the shocks were removed. These results indicate that the 
tension induced by the shocks served to accentuate relevant cues, but once they were removed a 
post-tension magnification occurred, which led to an erroneous overestimation in size.  
 A classic study from this time provides a further demonstration of this perspective. A 
group of 10-year-old children served as participants and were asked to adjust a light until they 
believed it was equal in size to the stimuli presented (Bruner & Goodman, 1947). One group of 
child participants was shown coins while the other group was shown discs of equal size to the 
coins. Results showed that the children overestimated the size of the coins, but not that of the 
discs despite the size of both being equal. Moreover, the overestimation tended to increase as the 
value of the coins increased such that dimes were overestimated more than nickels, but less so 
than quarters. Further, in a follow-up variation of the study, child participants were divided into a 
rich group, from prosperous and professional families, and a poor group, from slum areas. 
Although the children from rich families continued to overestimate the size of the coins, the 




indicate that the internal states of the children (i.e., their subjective need for financial resources) 
may have impacted their perception of the coins.  
 These initial studies showed how internal, unseen processes could influence how people 
perceive objects. However, they also point towards an important implication: not all bias is to the 
detriment of perception. Specifically, as shown by the increase in accuracy following the 
introduction of electric shocks, reactions are not always inhibitory, but rather they can lead to 
enhancements effects as well. Such effects are known as perceptual vigilance and refer to the 
reduction in recognition thresholds (Erdelyi, 1974).  
Cognitive Biases and Heuristics 
 Due to the studies conducted by the New Look researchers, behavioral scientists began to 
examine the manner in which a number of cognitive biases and heuristics could impact decision-
making processes. Although a plethora of cognitive biases may have the potential to support, and 
ultimately lead to, belief perseverance, there are five that may be particularly influential. These 
biases include cognitive dissonance, the availability heuristic, anchoring and adjustment, 
confirmation bias, and the tendency for people to be cognitive misers. Past research discussing 
and examining each of these biases in regards to their relation to beliefs or, in the case of 
cognitive misers, the tendency for them to lead to such biases is discussed below.  
 Cognitive dissonance  
 Developed in the 1950s, Cognitive Dissonance Theory posits that individuals experience 
mental discomfort or tension when they simultaneously hold two accessible beliefs that are 
inconsistent with one another or when a belief and a behavior are not aligned (Festinger, 1957). 
Such dissonance occurs during situations wherein a belief is met with contradictory evidence. 




similar to how the experience of hunger will lead individuals to proceed towards satiation. The 
simplest way to achieve such dissonance reduction is to simply change what one believes. For 
instance, an individual may hold the view that it is immoral to strike a child under any 
circumstance. However, after a particular incident occurs the individual may do so. The 
individual could then alter his or her view on the manner to avoid dissonance or could reduce 
dissonance by changing how he or she acts. That is, the individual could choose to never strike a 
child again. Finally, a third way to minimize the experience of dissonance would be to 
rationalize the behavior. For example, the individual could perceive that there was no choice, due 
to extraneous circumstances, to hit a child while also maintaining that it is immoral to do so.    
 Since its introduction in the literature, a litany of studies has been conducted to examine 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory. However, the seminal research was published shortly after the 
theory itself and provided a simple, yet effective method for assessing its impact (Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959). Participants took part in a repetitive and boring task where they spun spools, 
which was purposefully designed to be tedious. Those in the experimental condition were told 
beforehand that the study would be fun, whereas those in the control condition were not. 
Following the boring task, those in the experimental condition were given either one dollar or 20 
dollars (the equivalent of over 200 dollars in 2020) to tell a confederate that the task was 
exciting. It was hypothesized that participants in the one-dollar condition would rationalize their 
judgments and convince themselves that the task actually was enjoyable because they lacked an 
alternative justification. Conversely, those in the 20-dollar condition were predicted to view the 
task as unenjoyable because the financial compensation they received would serve as the main 




believe that the experiment was more enjoyable than those who received 20 dollars or those who 
were in the control condition.  
 More recent research has specifically discussed and examined the link between cognitive 
dissonance and belief perseverance (e.g., Zdrok, 2003). In one example, the impact of cognitive 
dissonance and belief perseverance on consumer choices was assessed (Darrat, 2017). The study 
examined whether receiving disconfirming evidence impacted consumer beliefs towards the 
perceived benefits of consuming organic foods. Results showed that dissonance occurred when 
individuals were given disconfirming evidence, which ultimately led to belief perseverance. That 
is, when presented with evidence contrary to their original belief, individuals tended to maintain 
their original belief. Similar to participants in the aforementioned studies, individuals who 
encounter contradictory information regarding the link between weight and aggression may 
experience cognitive dissonance and seek to rationalize it away, which could ultimately lead to 
belief perseverance.  
 The availability heuristic  
 Plane crashes are an incredibly rare event, yet people continually overestimate the rate of 
their occurrence. This is likely a result of the availability heuristic – a cognitive bias whereby an 
individual determines the likelihood of an event occurring based on how readily instances of 
such an event come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). To test this effect, researchers asked 
participants whether an English word is more likely to start with the letter K or have the letter K 
as its third letter. Results showed that participants overestimated the number of words that started 
with K and underestimated how many words had K as the third letter. These results supported 
the researchers’ hypotheses, as words that begin with a letter are more readily available in 




 More contemporary articles have explicitly posited the link between the availability 
heuristic and belief perseverance. For example, researchers have stated that the availability 
heuristic underlies belief perseverance in relation to task performance (Anderson, 2007). When 
individuals are assessing their ability to perform a task they are likely to attempt to recall how 
well they have done previously on similar tasks and their assessment is based on how readily 
available such memories come to mind. Similar to participants asked to recall words with K as 
the third letter, individuals who receive information regarding the link between weight and 
aggression that conflicts with their own views may have more difficulty recalling it in the future. 
This would then make any confirmatory information or views they may hold more readily 
available and could therefore lead to belief perseverance.  
 Anchoring and adjustment 
 A common sales technique is to offer a high starting price that is above fair market value. 
This high starting price then serves as an anchor, which leads to a higher final price than if the 
initial offer had been more fair. This process, where people make estimates based on an initial 
value that is subsequently adjusted to reach a final conclusion, is known as anchoring and 
adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). After beginning with an initial value (i.e., an anchor), 
individuals tend to make inadequate adjustments. This results in the initial value having a 
substantial impact on subsequent assessments.  
 To test this bias, an experiment was conducted that had participants estimate the 
percentage of African member countries in the United Nations. First, a number was selected by 
spinning a wheel in front of participants, which was secretly designed to land either at 10 or 65. 
Participants were then asked if they believed the percentage was higher or lower than the number 




estimated African countries made up 25 percent of the United Nations, whereas those who saw 
the wheel land at 65 estimated the percentage to be 45. In a further study, researchers asked 
participants to estimate the product of a numerical expression within five seconds that was 
written either as 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X 7 X 8 or as 8 X 7 X 6 X 5 X 4 X 3 X 2 X 1 (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). Participants did not have enough time to complete the calculation and 
therefore had to estimate based on the first few computations. Results revealed that estimates 
were significantly lower when the sequence began with the number one than when the sequence 
began with the number eight.  
 Building on this earlier work, researchers have gone on to specifically examine the link 
between anchoring and the perseverance of beliefs. In one such study, self-efficacy beliefs were 
assessed and participants were randomly assigned to a low, moderate, high anchoring, or no 
anchor condition (Cervone & Palmer, 1990). Participants then completed a task where the 
outcome was controlled and completed a second self-efficacy assessment. Results showed that 
initial self-efficacy judgments persevered in all three anchoring conditions, but not in the no 
anchor condition. Much like participants in the above-mentioned studies, when people receive 
conflicting information relating to the link between weight and aggression, they may adjust their 
beliefs insufficiently. This would give the anchor a greater influence, which could then result in 
belief perseverance as people fail to adequately adjust their beliefs in light of new information.  
 Confirmation bias  
 Perhaps one of the most prevalent biases, and one of the most relevant to the current 
research, is that of confirmation bias. This bias is the tendency for people to seek out facts to 
support their beliefs, to more easily recall information that aligns with said beliefs, and to 




(Wason, 1960). First examined nearly sixty years ago, research has shown that individuals will 
often seek out information that supports, rather than contradicts, their initial beliefs. In an early 
study, participants were given a set of three numbers that conformed to a simple rule and were 
asked to generate further number sets to see whether or not they abided by the rule. Participants 
were given no time limits and once they believed they had discovered the rule they were asked to 
convey it to the experimenter. Results found that nearly four out of five participants convinced 
themselves of an incorrect rule. This occurred as a result of participants seeking out confirming 
evidence while avoiding information that may disconfirm their initial beliefs. 
 In addition to seeking out supportive information, people also have a tendency to more 
easily recall information that upholds a belief. In an early study examining such recall bias, 
participants reviewed a detailed overview of the life of a woman that described both extraverted 
and introverted traits (Snyder & Cantor, 1979). Two days after reviewing this information, 
participants were asked to assess the woman’s suitability for a job either as a real estate agent or 
as a librarian. Results found that when asked to recall factual material about the woman, 
participants recalled more extraverted traits for the real estate agent and more introverted traits 
for the librarian. In a related study, undergraduate participants were led to believe that either 
extraversion or introversion was associated with greater academic success (Kunda & Sanitioso, 
1989). Those in the extraversion and introversion conditions came to see themselves as having 
more extraverted or introverted traits, respectively.  
 Finally, individuals also have a proclivity to interpret new information in a manner that 
supports an initial belief. This phenomenon is known as biased assimilation due to the tendency 
for people to examine relevant evidence in a biased manner (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). In an 




taking opposing views on the subject. Participants rated the study that aligned with their views as 
being more convincing and of higher empirical quality. Moreover, proponents reported being 
more in favor of capital punishment while opponents reported being less in favor of capital 
punishment at the end of the study, which demonstrated attitude polarization.  
 More recent research has expanded upon earlier studies by developing a measure to 
assess how prone individuals are to confirmation bias (Rassin, 2008). These tendencies, to seek 
out, more easily recall, and interpret new information in such a manner as to support an initial 
belief, may all be highly relevant to the perseverance of beliefs. For instance, when assessing the 
weight of others individuals may seek out information that supports their initial beliefs. Further, 
when presented with conflicting information they may find it easier to recall facts that support 
their initial beliefs rather than those that contradict them, which ultimately results in the 
perseverance of weight stigma beliefs.  
 People as cognitive misers  
 Expanding upon previous studies indicating the ubiquity of heuristics used in decision-
making processes, researchers introduced the theory that people act as cognitive misers (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984). Similar to how a miser refrains from expending financial resources, the human 
brain often attempts to expend as little effort or cognitive resources as possible. It is this 
tendency for individuals to cognitively process information as quickly and simply as possible 
that gives rise to phenomenon such as the aforementioned availability heuristic. On the surface 
this may make people appear mentally slothful, but it is a rational approach to take. Individuals 
are bombarded with an incredible amount of information on a daily basis and without processes 
to help accelerate decision-making, such instances would digest an obscene amount of time in 




to use mental shortcuts and fall prey to biases, such as those listed above, which could act to 
serve as a precursor to belief perseverance in a number of situations including when assessing 
the weight of others.  
Belief Perseverance 
 It is a common occurrence for individuals to believe things that are no longer, or that 
never were, objectively true. As previously mentioned, this tendency to maintain beliefs even 
after those beliefs have been discredited is known as belief perseverance (Ross et al., 1975). 
Research in the realm of belief perseverance dates back nearly a century to Skinner’s (1948) 
finding that superstitions require only a limited amount of reinforcement to be steadfastly 
maintained. As an example he noted that this is a common occurrence among card players as a 
few accidental connections between a ritual and favorable outcomes are all that is required to 
maintain the belief that a certain behavior is the cause of their good fortune despite the 
contradiction of numerous unreinforced instances. 
 Although belief perseverance has been examined in several studies on a diverse array of 
topics, most have used what is known as the debriefing paradigm. In this paradigm, participants 
are randomly assigned to groups that receive opposing information. For example, one group may 
be informed that there is a strong positive relationship between two variables, whereas a second 
group may be told that there is a strong negative relationship between the same two variables. 
Participants in both of these conditions are later informed that the information they received was 
falsified and simply the result of random assignment before being asked to make a judgment 
related to the information presented. This highlights the strength of the paradigm as the 
previously received information should be completely discredited and set aside. Therefore, any 




result of random assignment are indicative of participants improperly having their judgments 
influenced on the basis of discredited information. Using a rational approach, participants should 
not rely on any discredited information to make their judgments. However, research has 
consistently found that they do.  
Nearly three decades after Skinner’s research on superstitions, the phenomenon of belief 
perseverance was directly assessed. Researchers gave participants false feedback after 
completing a discrimination task and subsequently informed them that the feedback was 
predetermined and not a reflection of their true performance (Ross et al., 1975). Despite being 
fully debriefed on the nature of the study and the deception that took place, those participants 
who received false positive feedback continued to rate themselves more favorably than those 
who received false negative feedback. These findings were followed-up with a similar study in 
which researchers falsely informed participants of either a positive or negative relationship 
between risk-taking and being a successful firefighter (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980). Once 
again, results showed that despite being debriefed and informed that the information was 
completely fictitious, participants continued to display their initial beliefs. Those participants 
who were told that there was a positive relationship between risk-taking and firefighting rated 
risky behaviors as being highly diagnostic of later success, whereas the opposite pattern was 
present for participants who were told of a negative relationship.  
Based on these early findings, researchers posited that the belief perseverance they 
discovered was due, at least in part, to participants creating narratives in their mind, a process 
that they referred to as formulating causal scenarios or explanations (Anderson et al., 1980). 
Using the Ross and colleagues (1975) study as an example, this reasoning would stipulate that 




that it was a task they were naturally talented at. This narrative then instills a confidence in their 
abilities to the point that even when the reason for their confidence is removed, which occurs 
after being told that the feedback was false, they still maintain their belief that they are superior 
at the task. Such narratives may be made explicitly within the conscious awareness of the 
individual or unconsciously in an implicit manner.  
Explicit and Implicit Processes 
 Although they are closely related and often used interchangeably, including in the present 
research, many researchers have distinguished between what constitutes a belief versus an 
attitude. Specific definitions vary, but in general, affective aspects have been assigned to 
attitudes whereas cognitive aspects have been assigned to beliefs (Fishbein & Raven, 1962). An 
important distinction is that while some beliefs may be explicit and known to whoever holds 
them, others may be implicit. These are distinguishable as explicit processes operate in a 
controlled manner, whereas implicit processes occur automatically. Controlled processes are 
characterized by being intentional, requiring substantial cognitive resources, having the ability to 
be stopped voluntarily, and operating within an individual’s conscious awareness (Gawronski & 
Creighton, 2013). Alternatively, automatic processes are characterized by being elicited 
unintentionally, requiring limited cognitive resources, the inability to be stopped voluntarily, and 
operating outside of conscious awareness (Bargh, 1994).  
 In addition to distinctions in conscious awareness and controllability, explicit and implicit 
beliefs also differ in terms of how they develop and how they change over time. When they were 
introduced in the literature, implicit beliefs were described as traces of past experiences that 
impact how we think, feel, or act towards social objects (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Based on 




form than explicit beliefs (Leaper, 2003). If implicit beliefs are based on past experience, then by 
definition they would require time to develop. Whereas explicit beliefs can be formed relatively 
quickly, implicit beliefs form over time to the point at which they occur automatically beyond 
conscious awareness.    
 Not only do implicit beliefs take longer to form than explicit beliefs, they also show 
greater stability over time (Baron & Banaji, 2006). Of particular importance to the current 
research is the recent finding that implicit attitudes towards weight were stable over the course of 
13 years (Charlesworth & Banaji, 2019). In contrast, explicit beliefs have been shown to be 
susceptible to manipulations intended to alter them (e.g., Goulding, Furze, & Birks, 2010). 
Additionally, explicit and implicit beliefs have been shown to synergistically predict intentions 
and behaviors (Muschalik, Elfeddali, Candel, & de Vries. 2018). Taken together, these studies 
indicate the importance of considering both explicit and implicit beliefs. Specifically, they 
suggest that implicit beliefs may serve to moderate the influence of explicit beliefs as measured 
in the context of the debriefing paradigm.  
Dual-Process Models 
 Over the past several decades a great deal of research has been conducted by utilizing a 
category of theories known as dual-process theories. Although these theories vary in scope and 
terminology, they all divide cognitive processes underpinning judgments and behavior into two 
categories: controlled and automatic (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). However, this is not to say that 
all processes are entirely controlled or automatic, rather they exist on a spectrum (Melnikoff & 
Bargh, 2018). In fact, processes are likely to be multi-determined based on a number of factors, 
such as motivation or cognitive resources, which leads to variation in the degree to which they 




concerned with the weak relation between controlled processes and behavior (Blumer, 1955; 
Festinger, 1964). The entirety of such dual-process models is too plentiful for this review, but an 
examination of some of the more prevalent theories warrants further discussion.  
 One of the most prominent dual-process theories is the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM is used in the persuasion literature to assess when 
differing facets of persuasive messages impact the effectiveness of persuasive appeals. The main 
premise of the model is that there are two routes through which the persuasiveness of a message 
is assessed based on how motivated and able individuals are to participate in information 
processing. The ELM posits that such levels of motivation and ability lead to the use of either the 
central or the peripheral route for information processing. The central route is explicit and 
controlled. Using this approach, an individual would assess all relevant information and carefully 
evaluate the strength of the presented arguments to reach a decision. Conversely, the peripheral 
route is implicit and automatic. Utilizing this route an individual will often make decisions based 
on cues, heuristics, or biases, such as the attractiveness of the messenger.    
 While the ELM examines how persuasion can change attitudes, other dual-process 
models have focused on how and when pre-existing attitudes impact behaviors. An example of 
this model type is the Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) model (Fazio, 
1990). The MODE model posits two processes that serve to direct behavior based upon an 
individual’s level of motivation and whether the opportunity is present to participate in effortful 
processing. Specifically, the model suggests that there is a spontaneous process, which is implicit 
and automatic, and a deliberate process, which is explicit and controlled. When an individual has 




is likely to occur. However, when motivation, opportunity, or both are absent, an individual is 
likely to utilize the spontaneous process.  
 Based on the processes laid out in the ELM and MODE models it may be possible to 
understand how some beliefs persist even after they have been discredited. Using Anderson and 
colleagues (1980) study as an example, the ELM and MODE models would suggest that 
participants who lacked the motivation or opportunity to engage in effortful processing would be 
more likely to rely on spontaneous (i.e., implicit) processes. If a participant had been given false 
information about a positive relationship between success as a firefighter and risk-taking 
behavior, then such a belief may persist unless the participant is motivated and able to 
deliberately process the false nature of the information. That is, without consciously and 
effortfully updating a belief, individuals may depend on implicit beliefs as a result of 
spontaneous processing through the peripheral route following the debriefing paradigm.  
 In contrast to phenomenon-specific dual-process theories such as the ELM and MODE 
model, more general dual-process theories have also been posited. One such theory distinguishes 
between the dichotomy of System 1 and System 2 processing (Kahneman, 2003). Developed in 
an attempt to connect previous research on biases and heuristics, the theory differentiates 
between automatic and controlled processes. System 1 (i.e., automatic) processes occur quickly, 
with little to no effort or conscious awareness, and are often based on emotions. Conversely, 
System 2 (i.e., controlled) processes are slower, require effort and conscious awareness, and are 
not driven by emotional responses. Therefore, if no attitude is formed via System 1, then 
decisions are made solely through the use of System 2. However, if System 1 generates an 




the response. Similar to the MODE model, if System 2 is not activated, System 1 may be entirely 
responsible for decisions, which could contribute to the perseverance of beliefs.  
 The Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM) is another highly regarded dual-process theory 
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The RIM suggests that behavior is the result of two information 
processing systems that operate in parallel. The reflective system functions under conscious 
awareness (i.e., controlled), whereas the impulsive system is always activated and operates based 
on unconscious processes (i.e., automatic). Despite the simultaneous nature of the two systems, 
the impulsive system takes precedent as, unlike the reflective system, it does not require a 
minimum threshold of cognitive capacity to operate. That is, when resources are low the 
impulsive system will control behavior, whereas when resources are high the reflective system 
will have the ability to override the impulsive system. 
Stigma 
 Although belief perseverance may occur in relation to a number of phenomenon, this is 
likely especially true with regards to stigma. That is, evidence may arise when we encounter 
individuals suggesting that they possess an attribute that makes them less desirable. They are 
then reduced from being viewed as ‘complete’ and ‘normal’ individuals to being viewed as 
‘blemished’ and ‘less worthy’, and it is this which is referred to as stigma (Goffman, 1963). In 
ancient Greece, the term stigma was used to reference signs of low moral status as such signs 
were physically burnt or cut into individuals to signify their worth or lack thereof. Over time, 
stigma has come to refer to anything of disgrace. Such stigmata can still refer to visual 
indicators, but have also been used with regards to internal processes such as stigma towards 
anxiety, depression, or homosexuality (Griffiths, Batterham, Barney, & Parsons, 2011; Kanter, 





 A plethora of stigmata are currently present in Western culture, but perhaps none is more 
prevalent than that of weight stigma – the social rejection and devaluation that accompanies 
individuals who do not align with idealized social norms regarding weight and body shape 
(Tomiyama et al., 2018). Studies have long shown the prevalence of weight stigma beliefs. 
Nearly six decades ago researchers presented children with six images of their peers and had 
them rank the images (Richardson, Goodman, Hastorf, & Dornbusch, 1961). The images 
included a normal weight child, a child with crutches, a child in a wheelchair, a child with a hand 
missing, a child with a facial disfigurement, and an obese child. Results showed that regardless 
of participants’ own race, economic status, or physical ability, the obese child was consistently 
ranked last. Moreover, further analysis revealed that while both males and females ranked 
children with social impairments lowest (i.e., facial disfigurement and obesity), this effect was 
even greater among females.  
 More recent research into the stigmatization of overweight individuals has found that it is 
not only widespread, but that the occurrence of such weight stigma is increasing (Vartanian, 
Pinkus, & Smyth, 2018). Attitudes towards obese individuals seem to be worsening and those 
who are obese are frequently evaluated in a more negative manner than a host of similarly 
discriminated against groups. This is problematic given the aforementioned detrimental effects 
that weight stigma can have on individuals (e.g., exercise avoidance, increase in caloric intake, 
poorer health care outcomes, and adverse psychological outcomes). Additionally, overweight 
individuals tend to be stereotyped as lazy, weak, or self-indulgent, and they face discrimination 
from family, health care providers, coworkers, classmates, and even from other overweight 




stigma has spread to what used to be fat-positive cultures and that in some studies people have 
been shown to prefer someone who is mentally ill, has a sexually transmittable infection, or is a 
recovering drug addict over someone who is overweight for a potential romantic partner 
(Vartanian, Pinkus, & Smyth, 2014). 
 Although early research focused exclusively on explicit weight stigma, more modern 
studies have begun to examine the impact of implicit views towards weight as well. In one such 
study children explicitly chose overweight figures as friends only 9% of the time (Hutchinson & 
Müller, 2018). Moreover, the children displayed an implicit preference towards thin individuals 
and this preference grew higher as children aged. In a related study, parents were shown to 
display the same types of biases using both explicit and implicit measures (Lydecker, O'Brien, & 
Grilo, 2018). Taken together, these studies indicate that both explicit and implicit beliefs play a 
role in the assessment of weight stigma, which makes it an excellent vessel to use in the 
examination of belief perseverance.  
Research Overview and Hypotheses 
 Based on the prevalence of belief perseverance and weight stigma, the current study 
tested four hypotheses regarding the relation between these variables. First, it tested the 
hypothesis that belief perseverance would replicate to views related to weight stigma, which may 
help to partially explain the pervasiveness of this phenomenon. Second, it tested whether implicit 
beliefs moderate the impact of explicit beliefs with regards to belief perseverance, which may 
help to explain belief perseverance effects found in previous studies while also indicating a 
possible underlying factor in the persistence of weight stigma. That is, existing implicit beliefs 
may impact how participants respond to the experimental manipulation such that stronger 




whether the tendency to fall prey to confirmation bias or the anchoring heuristic moderated the 
impact of explicit beliefs. Fourth, it tested whether any such effects persist beyond their initial 
conception. Specifically, whether said effects are present 48 hours following the debriefing 
paradigm or whether they are limited to occurring only immediately following the experimental 
manipulation. 
 Using the debriefing paradigm, participants read a report regarding the link between 
weight and aggression in young adults and then completed explicit and implicit measures related 
to stigmatized weight attitudes. In one condition participants were informed that there is a 
positive correlation between weight and aggression in young adults, whereas in a second 
condition participants learned that there is a negative correlation between weight and aggression 
in young adults. A survey assessing the tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner was 
administered immediately after the debriefing paradigm had concluded, which was followed by 
the explicit and implicit measures regarding views towards weight. Additionally, explicit and 
implicit measures, as well as a measure to assess the tendency to fall prey to confirmation bias 
and a brief task to examine for anchoring, were administered 48 hours following the initial 






CHAPTER 2. METHOD 
 
Power Analysis 
 The statistical software G*Power was used to estimate the appropriate sample size 
required to detect the main effect of belief perseverance (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007). The analysis was conducted using the conservative power value of 1-β = 0.90 at an alpha 
level of α = .05 (Cohen, 1992). With respect to effect sizes found in previous research using 
explicit measures, one of the earliest studies on belief perseverance reported a fairly large effect 
size, z = ~2.75 (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980). However, more contemporary studies have 
reported more moderate effect sizes based on both non-significant, Cohen’s f = .21, and 
significant results, Cohen’s f = .23 (More et al., 2016; More, Madon, Guyll, & Ditchfield, 2018). 
Although a moderate effect is expected with regards to explicit measures, recent research has 
found that implicit beliefs have a moderately small effect, Cohen’s f2 = .06 (Mensinger & 
Meadows, 2017). Based on these previous studies, a relatively small effect size, Cohen’s f2 = .05, 
was used to estimate the sample size (Cohen, 1988). Based on these parameters, the power 
analysis revealed that a minimum sample size of 257 would be required to meet the desired level 
of power. However, due to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, data collection was terminated early 
and this minimum sample size was not achieved.  
Participants 
 Participants (N = 172) were Iowa State University students who were recruited through 
the SONA system subject pool and participated in exchange for meeting course requirements. 
Eight participants were excluded for failing random response check items, seven participants 
were removed for failing an attention check question, and four participants were excluded based 




participants were randomly distributed between experimental conditions with the final sample 
consisting of 153 participants, including 87 women and 66 men between the ages of 18 and 35 
with a mean age of 19.28 years. There were 109 European Americans, 14 Latin Americans, 11 
Asian Americans, eight African Americans, and 11 participants who identified as multi-ethnic. 




 In addition to sex, age, ethnicity, and political affiliation, participants also reported their 
level of desire to lose weight as well as their height in inches and their weight in pounds. 
Reported heights and weights were then used to calculate a body mass index (BMI) score for 
each participant. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), a BMI score between 
18.5 and 24.9 indicates normal weight while those with a BMI score below 18.5 are considered 
underweight, those with scores over 25 are seen as overweight or pre-obesity, and those with 
scores above 30 are categorized as obese (de Onis, Garza, Onyango, & Martorell, 2006). 
Explicit Beliefs 
 The Attitudes Toward Obese Persons (ATOP) scale was used to assess explicit beliefs 
towards overweight individuals (see Appendix B; Allison, Basile, & Yuker, 1991). The ATOP 
scale is a 20-item measure that assesses beliefs regarding obesity with higher scores indicating 
more positive attitudes towards obese persons. Participants respond to questions on a 6-point 
Likert-type scale with endpoints -3 (strongly disagree) and 3 (strongly agree). Previous research 
has established the validity and reliability of the ATOP scale in English as well as Korean, 




Deveci, 2014; Kim, Lee, Hwang, Kim, & Park, 2010; Lacroix, Alberga, Russell-Mathew, 
McLaren, & von Ranson, 2017; Tsai et al., 2019). One additional question was added to the end 
of the survey to explicitly address the dependent variable. In addition to the 20 ATOP items, 
participants were also asked at the 48 hour follow-up: “What do you believe the correlation is 
between weight and aggression in young adults?”, with endpoints -3 (negative correlation) and 
3 (positive correlation) as well as a midpoint of 0 (no relation). Descriptions of negative and 
positive correlations in the context of the experimental manipulation were included to ensure that 
participants were able to properly interpret the question. 
Implicit Beliefs      
 The Implicit Association Test (IAT) was used to measure implicit beliefs towards weight 
with higher scores indicating a greater level of implicit bias. The standard IAT measures the 
strength of associations between attitude objects and concepts, such as between overweight 
individuals and the concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
However, research has shown that the personalized version of the IAT, which uses the concepts 
of ‘I like’ and ‘I dislike’, is more strongly correlated with explicit measures (Olson & Fazio, 
2004). Therefore, the personalized version of the IAT was implemented. The iatgen program was 
used to create an IAT for implicit beliefs towards weight (Carpenter et al., 2018). Participants 
were asked to match words from ‘I like’ (e.g., attractive, appealing, terrific) and ‘I dislike’ 
categories (e.g., horrible, despise, negative) with images of thin, normal weight, and overweight 
individuals.  
 Since its creation, the IAT has faced some noteworthy and valid criticism. The IAT 
measures the relative ease with which people associate two concepts or an attitude object and a 




increase the likelihood of improperly rejecting the null hypothesis (Cronbach & Furby, 1970). 
More importantly, some research has revealed that IAT scores fail to predict behavior (e.g., Lee, 
2018). However, researchers have also found that the IAT has test-retest reliability and 
predictive validity (e.g., Rae & Olson 2018). Moreover, the IAT is the most common implicit 
measure used in psychology research (Gattol, Sääksjärvi, & Claus-Christian, 2011). For these 
reasons, the IAT was used in the current research.  
Social Desirability 
 To detect, and if necessary control for, the presence of a response bias, the Personal 
Reaction Inventory (PRI) was utilized as a means of identifying participants who may have 
responded in a socially desirable manner (see Appendix C; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The PRI 
assesses the tendency for individuals to respond in a way that will make them appear more 
favorable rather than to respond how they truly feel. The PRI was chosen as socially desirable 
responding is always a concern in research examining bias or prejudice and there has been 
extensive research into the reliability and validity of the PRI scale (Beretvas, Meyers, & Leite, 
2002; Johnson, Fendrich, & Mackesy-Amiti, 2012; Leite & Beretvas, 2005). 
 Although the full PRI is a 33-item scale, the 13-item short form scale was used to reduce 
the number of items participants needed to respond to in an attempt to decrease the likelihood of 
random responding. Similar to the full PRI, the short form scale is comprised of true and false 
statements, which assess the natural tendency an individual has towards responding in a manner 
that is socially desirable. Higher scores on the PRI indicate a tendency to respond in a more 
socially desirable manner while lower scores suggest a lack of response bias. The reliability and 




Prior to data collection it was determined that if PRI scores correlate with an outcome variable, 
then they would be used as a covariate in the analyses. 
Attention Check 
 A one-item attention check was utilized to ensure that participants read, remembered, and 
understood the false information they were provided: (1) “The article you read indicated that 
there is __________ correlation between weight and aggression in young adults.”, with “a 
negative”, “a positive”, and “no” as answer options. Definitions of what constitutes a negative or 
positive correlation in the context of the present information were included to ensure participants 
fully comprehended the question.  
Random Responding Check 
 Participants who randomly respond to survey items can have a significant impact on 
effect size estimates and statistical results (Credé, 2010). Therefore, two random response check 
items were placed within the survey measures in an attempt to identify any participants who 
were randomly responding. Participants who did not correctly answer either or both of the 
random response checks were eliminated from the data. Additionally, any participants who 
completed more than 10% of their IATs in fewer than 300ms were removed from all analyses as 
such speeds are consistent with random responding. 
Individual Differences in Cognitive Biases 
 It is a well-established and encouraged practice in psychological research to examine 
individual differences simultaneously with the assessment of group-level phenomenon 
(Cronbach, 1957). With this in mind, individual differences in the tendency to engage in 
cognitive biases were examined. Specifically, the proclivity to engage in confirmation bias and 




the Need for Closure scale was used, which examines the level of unwillingness an individual 
has to having his or her knowledge confronted by alternative opinions or inconsistent evidence 
(see Appendix D; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Previous 
research has established the validity and reliability of the Need for Closure scale and closed-
mindedness subscale, which is designed such that higher scores indicate a greater level of 
unwillingness to integrate contradictory evidence or opposing views (Leone, Wallace, & 
Modglin, 1999).  
 In contrast to confirmation bias, the examination of anchoring required a brief task rather 
than a scale as there are no adequate measures available at this time. In the seminal work on 
anchoring, researchers asked participants to make a judgment regarding whether a quantity was 
higher or lower than a number that was randomly generated (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Since 
then, researchers have used this method to examine group effects of anchor magnitude (e.g., 
Stanovich & West, 2008). However, a more recent approach has been used to examine individual 
differences and was modified and implemented for the current study (Teovanović, Knežević, & 
Stankov, 2015). Participants first provided an anchor-free estimate to the question used in the 
original anchoring study: “What is the percentage of African countries in the United Nations?” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Participants were later asked a similar question modified from the 
standard paradigm of anchoring: “Do you think the percentage of African countries in the United 
Nations is higher or lower than 65%?” before being asked to once again provide an estimate to 
the question (Stanovich & West, 2008). A bias score was then calculated as the difference 
between the two estimates divided by the difference between the anchor and the initial estimate, 
which resulted in a scale where higher scores indicated a higher level of anchoring (Teovanović, 





 Upon arrival to the experimental session, participants were told that the study involved a 
few brief surveys to be completed 48 hours apart and that they were designed to assess various 
attitudes and beliefs. Participants first provided demographic information before being presented 
with a falsified report indicating either that researchers have consistently found a positive 
correlation between weight and aggression in young adults or that they have consistently found a 
negative correlation between weight and aggression in young adults. Participants were then 
asked to provide possible reasons as to why this relation between weight and aggression in 
young adults exists before completing the PRI scale to assess for response bias. Afterwards, 
participants were informed that this information was falsified and distributed at random before 
being asked to complete the ATOP scale to assess for explicit beliefs towards obese persons and 
an IAT to assess for implicit beliefs towards weight. After 48 hours, participants were expected 
to return to complete the ATOP scale and weight IAT a second time as well as the closed-








 Table 1 presents the means, standard errors, and confidence intervals for participants’ 
time 1 ATOP, time 2 ATOP, time 1 IAT, time 2 IAT, PRI, closed-mindedness, and anchoring 
scores as well as their BMI and level of desire to lose weight organized by experimental 
condition. Note that average BMI scores fell in the normal range for participants in the false 
negative information condition, n = 76, M = 23.74, SD = 3.81, as well as for those in the false 
positive information condition, n = 77, M = 24.07, SD = 4.66. Additionally, Table 2 presents the 
correlations between variables for the entire sample whereas Table 3 presents the correlations 
separately for participants in the negative and positive correlation conditions.  
Attention Check 
 Participants were administered a single attention check item to ensure they were 
cognizant of the main manipulation between conditions. Out of 172 initial participants, seven 
(4.07%) failed to correctly identify the false information presented to them as showing either a 
negative or a positive correlation between weight and aggression in young adults. These 
participants were removed from all analyses to ensure that the final sample consisted solely of 
individuals who properly comprehended the material. 
Random Responding Check 
 Participants were presented with two random response check items as the inclusion of 
random responding has been shown to significantly impact statistical results (Credé, 2010). Out 
of 172 initial participants, eight (4.65%) failed to correctly respond to one or both of the items, 




found to have completed more than 10% of their IATs in under 300ms. Therefore, all of these 
participants were removed from the data to safeguard against the negative impacts of random 
responding, which resulted in a final sample of 153 participants. 
Main Analyses 
 Prior to all analyses, the assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance were 
assessed for the single assessment item of the dependent variable (i.e., “What do you believe is 
the actual correlation between body mass and aggression in young adults?”) and for ATOP 
scores (i.e., explicit beliefs towards weight). Additionally, the data were also examined for 
skewness and kurtosis as well as the possible presence of any outliers. A Shapiro-Wilk test 
indicated that the assumption of normality had not been met for the single assessment item, 
W(153) = 0.91, p < .001. However, an inspection of the corresponding histogram of responses 
indicated that the data appeared normal and that the significance of the Shapiro-Wilk test was 
likely a result of the substantial number of participants who chose the middle option of no 
correlation (see Figure 1).  
 After examining the histogram of the single assessment item responses, two further 
Shapiro-Wilk tests were conducted and indicated that the assumption of normality had been met 
for ATOP scores at both time 1, W(153) = 0.99, p = .389, and at time 2, W(153) = 1.00, p = .874. 
Homogeneity of variance was then assessed with the results of three Levene’s tests showing that 
the assumption was met for the single assessment item, F(1, 151) = 0.00, p = .989, as well as for 
ATOP scores at both time 1, F(1, 151) = 0.14, p = .711, and at time 2, F(1, 151) = 0.11, p = .745. 
Additionally, an examination of the single assessment item and ATOP scores at both time 1 and 
time 2 found that neither skewness, all ps > .05, nor kurtosis, all ps > .05, were significant. 




to z scores to detect for the presence of outliers. No scores surpassed the three standard deviation 
threshold in either direction, which indicated that no outliers were present.   
 Before assessing differences in the single assessment item and ATOP scores, correlations 
were first examined to determine if initial differences should be examined by utilizing a t-test or 
a one-way ANCOVA. Bivariate correlations revealed that there were no significant correlations 
between the single assessment item and BMI, r = .04, p = .671, desire to lose weight, r = .05, p = 
.556, nor PRI scores, r = -.06, p = 444. Additionally, there were no significant correlations 
between time 1 ATOP scores and BMI, r = -.15, p = .070, nor desire to lose weight, r = .04, p = 
.602. Similarly, there were no significant correlations between time 2 ATOP scores and BMI, r = 
-.10, p = .220, nor desire to lose weight, r = .09, p = .274. However, there was a significant 
correlation for PRI scores with regards to both time 1 ATOP scores, r = .28, p < .001, and time 2 
ATOP scores, r = .24, p = .003.  
 To further examine the influence of response bias, partial correlations were examined to 
determine the impact that response bias, as indicated by PRI scores, had on the correlation 
between IAT and ATOP scores. Partial correlation results controlling for PRI scores found that 
there was relationship between time 1 IAT and ATOP scores, rxy• z = .22, p = .006, as well as 
between time 2 IAT and ATOP scores, rxy• z = .21, p = .010. Based on the correlational results, 
differences in responses to the single assessment item between participants in the false positive 
and negative correlation conditions were assessed using an independent samples t-test. 
Conversely, two separate one-way ANCOVAs using PRI scores as a covariate were conducted to 
examine differences in ATOP scores at time 1 and time 2 as a function of false information 




belief perseverance effect would replicate to weight stigma beliefs, and the third research 
hypothesis, whether such effects persist beyond their initial conception.  
 The t-test of the single assessment item was conducted first as it represented the simplest 
and most straight forward examination of the belief perseverance effect. This item was only 
assessed once, at the very end of the second experimental session, in an attempt to avoid alerting 
participants to the true nature of the experimental hypotheses. Results revealed that participants 
did respond differently based upon which false information condition they were in, t(151) = -
3.47, p = .001, d = 0.56. Moreover, the results were in the expected direction as participants who 
received false information regarding a negative correlation between weight and aggression in 
young adults rated said correlation as more negative, n = 76, M = -0.09, SD = 1.09, than did 
participants who received false information claiming a positive correlation between weight and 
aggression in young adults, n = 77, M = 0.48, SD = 0.95. 
 Following the t-test, the first one-way between subjects ANCOVA was conducted to 
examine the effect of false information on explicit beliefs towards overweight individuals while 
controlling for the effect of socially desirable responding at time 1. The false information 
condition did not lead to a meaningful difference in terms of time 1 ATOP scores, F(1, 150) = 
2.76, p = .098, ηp² = .018, between those participants in the negative correlation condition, M = 
62.59, SD = 12.72, and those in the positive correlation condition, M = 65.48, SD = 12.56, after 
controlling for the effect of response bias as measured by PRI scores. However, PRI scores were 
a significant covariate in the model, F(1, 150) = 13.8, p < .001, ηp² = .084. It should be noted that 
due to the limited sample size the observed power for detecting differences between the false 
negative correlation and false positive correlation information, 1-βo = 0.38, was substantially 




from a second one-way ANCOVA were similar with respect to time 2 ATOP scores as once 
again the false information condition did not have a significant impact between those participants 
in the negative correlation condition, M = 64.54, SD = 14.51, and those in the positive correlation 
condition, M = 66.31, SD = 13.36, after accounting for participants’ PRI scores, F(1, 150) = 0.94, 
p = .335, ηp² = .006. However, PRI scores were once again a significant covariate, F(1, 150) = 
9.52, p = .002, ηp² = .060, but the observed power for detecting differences between experimental 
conditions was also very low, 1-βo = 0.16. 
Model 1: Moderation of Belief Perseverance by Implicit Beliefs at Time 1  
 Following the t-test and one-way ANCOVAs, a moderation analysis was conducted to 
assess the second research hypothesis regarding whether implicit beliefs towards weight 
moderate the effect of false information on explicit beliefs towards obese persons (see Figure 2). 
To assess for moderation, Model 1 from the PROCESS program using 5000 bootstrapped 
samples was utilized (Hayes, 2013). The false information condition (i.e., negative or positive 
correlation) served as the predictor variable with ATOP scores at time 1 (i.e., explicit beliefs) as 
the outcome variable. Response bias as measured by PRI scores once again served as a covariate 
in the model. IAT scores at time 1 (i.e., implicit beliefs towards weight) were used as the 
moderator with IAT results being scored using the iatgen program in Qualtrics (Carpenter et al., 
2018). This scoring system leads to a difference score, D, for each participant, which is similar to 
Cohen’s d (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).  
 Prior to conducting the first model, scores on the moderator (i.e., IAT scores) were mean 
centered to aid in the interpretation of coefficients and any possible interaction effects. Results 
from this first model revealed that the overall model was significant with a moderate effect size, 




that the main effect of false information was marginally significant, b = 3.74, t(148) = 1.95, p = 
.053, β = .15. Meanwhile, IAT scores were shown to be a meaningful predictor in the model, b = 
16.33, t(148) = 2.03, p = .044, β = .51, and PRI scores were a significant covariate, b = 1.20, 
t(148) = 3.86, p < .001, β = .29. Conversely, the addition of the interaction did not make a 
meaningful difference when added to the model, F(1, 148) = 1.41, p = .236, ΔR2 = .01, which 
indicated a lack of moderation.  
 Finally, the simple slopes of the conditional effect of false information on explicit beliefs 
were examined. With respect to the iatgen program, for the purposes of this study positive D 
scores correspond to an implicit bias against overweight individuals whereas negative values 
correspond to an implicit bias in favor of overweight individuals and zero score values indicate a 
lack of bias altogether (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Results revealed that for those with 
an implicit bias against overweight individuals (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean), 
false information had a zero effect on explicit beliefs, b = 1.44, t(148) = 0.53, p = .596. 
Conversely, for those with an implicit bias in favor of overweight individuals, (i.e., one standard 
deviation below the mean), false information did impact explicit beliefs, b = 6.05, t(148) = 2.21, 
p = .029, such that receiving false information about a positive correlation between weight and 
aggression is associated with an increase in positive attitudes towards obese persons. Meanwhile, 
for those with no meaningful bias in either direction, false information marginally impacted 
explicit beliefs, b = 3.74, t(148) = 1.95, p = .053, as once again receiving false information about 
a positive correlation between weight and aggression was associated with an increase in positive 
attitudes towards obese persons. This indicates that aggression was viewed as a positive attribute 





Model 2: Moderation of Belief Perseverance by Implicit Beliefs at Time 2  
 Following model 1, a second moderation analysis was conducted to assess the third 
research hypothesis. Specifically, whether any moderation effects would persist beyond their 
initial conception and be present 48 hours following the experimental manipulation (see Figure 
2). Once more, Model 1 from the PROCESS program using 5000 bootstrapped samples was 
utilized with the ATOP scores and IAT scores from time 1 being replaced by those from time 2 
(Hayes, 2013). 
 Results from this second model revealed that the overall model was significant with a 
small effect size, F(4, 148) = 4.37, p = .002, R2 = .11. The individual predictors were then 
examined and revealed that there was a zero effect of false information on ATOP scores, b = 
2.31, t(148) = 1.07, p = .286, β = .08. Similarly, IAT scores did not predict ATOP scores in the 
model, b = 6.62, t(148) = 0.72, p = .474, β = 18. However, PRI scores were once again a 
significant covariate, b = 1.14, t(148) = 3.20, p = .002, β = .25. Conversely, the addition of the 
interaction did not make a meaningful difference when added to the model, F(1, 148) = 0.15, p = 
.902, ΔR2 < .01, which indicated a lack of moderation.  
 Finally, the simple slopes of the conditional effect of false information on explicit beliefs 
were then examined. Results showed that for those with an implicit bias against overweight 
individuals (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean), false information had a zero effect on 
explicit beliefs, b = 2.59, t(148) = 0.84, p = .401. Similarly, for those with an implicit bias in 
favor of overweight individuals, (i.e., one standard deviation below the mean), false information 
also had a zero effect on explicit beliefs, b = 2.04, t(148) = 0.66, p = .509. This remained the case 
for those with no meaningful bias in either direction, as there was no significant impact of false 




Individual Differences in Cognitive Biases 
 Following an assessment of the moderating effect of implicit beliefs, a series of multiple 
regression models were conducted to examine the possibility of individual differences in 
cognitive biases predicting ATOP scores. Specifically, the regression models assessed how the 
tendency for participants to fall prey to confirmation bias or be overly influence by an initial 
anchor impacted explicit beliefs, as indicated by ATOP scores at time 1 and at time 2. The first 
regression model added closed-mindedness scores to a model with participants’ PRI scores (i.e., 
response bias) predicting ATOP scores at time 1. Results revealed that the overall model was 
significant, F(2, 150) = 8.48, p < .001, R2 = .10, and that scores on the closed-mindedness scale 
marginally predicted ATOP scores, b = -0.39, t(150) = -1.92, p = .057, β = -.16. Similarly, 
participants’ level of response bias as measured by the PRI predicted ATOP scores, b = 0.96, 
t(150) = 2.88, p = .005, β = .23. The next regression model examined the addition of scores on an 
anchoring bias task to a model with the PRI scores predicting ATOP scores at time 1. Results 
showed that the overall model was significant, F(2, 150) = 8.89, p < .001, R2 = .11, and that 
anchoring scores predicted ATOP scores, b = -4.32, t(150) = -2.10, p = .037, β = -.16. Similarly, 
PRI scores once again predicted ATOP scores, b = 1.15, t(150) = 3.64, p < .001, β = .28. 
 The next two models once again assessed the tendency to fall prey to confirmation bias or 
anchoring, but were now focused on time 2 ATOP scores. The first of these regression models 
added closed-mindedness scores to a model with the PRI scores predicting ATOP scores at time 
2. Results revealed that the overall model was significant, F(2, 150) = 5.10, p = .007, R2 = .06, 
but that closed-mindedness scores did not predict ATOP scores, b = -0.22, t(150) = -0.98, p = 
.331, β = -.08. However, participants’ PRI scores did predict their ATOP scores, b = 0.97, t(150) 




scores to a model with PRI scores predicting ATOP scores at time 2. Results showed that the 
overall model was significant, F(2, 150) = 6.77, p = .002, R2 = .08, and that scores on the 
anchoring bias task continued to predict ATOP scores, b = -4.62, t(150) = -2.03, p = .045, β = -
.16. Consistent with the previous regression models, participants’ PRI scores predicted ATOP 
scores, b = 1.08, t(150) = 3.05, p = .003, β = .24.  
 After three of the regression models indicated that individual differences in the tendency 
to fall prey to cognitive biases predicted ATOP scores, three follow-up moderation models were 
conducted to determine whether or not such individual differences moderated the relationship 
between the false information condition and ATOP scores. The first test of moderation once 
again used Model 1 from the PROCESS program using 5000 bootstrapped samples (Hayes, 
2013). The false information condition served as the predictor variable with ATOP scores from 
time 1 as the outcome variable and PRI scores again serving as a covariate. Closed-mindedness 
scores were then used as the moderator in this first model (see Figure 3).  
 Results from this first model revealed that the overall model was significant with a small 
effect size, F(4, 148) = 5.63, p < .001, R2 = .13. The individual predictors were then examined 
and revealed that there was a zero effect of false information on ATOP scores, b = -12.15, t(148) 
= -1.35, p = .180, β = -.48. However, closed-mindedness scores did predict ATOP scores in the 
model, b = -1.35, t(148) = -2.21, p = .029, β = -.54, and PRI scores were a significant covariate, 
b = 1.00, t(148) = 3.01, p = .003, β = .24. Conversely, the addition of the interaction did not 
make a meaningful difference when added to the model, F(1, 148) = 2.93, p = .089, ΔR2 = .02, 
which indicated a lack of moderation.  
 A second model was then conducted examining anchoring scores as a possible moderator 




significant with a small effect size, F(4, 148) = 5.70, p < .001, R2 = .13. The individual predictors 
were then assessed and revealed that there was a main effect of false information on ATOP 
scores, b = 4.80, t(148) = 2.15, p = .034, β = .19. Meanwhile, anchoring scores predicted ATOP 
scores in the model, b = 6.13, t(148) = 0.75, p = .452, β = .23. However, PRI scores were once 
again a significant covariate, b = 1.20, t(148) = 3.79, p < .001, β = .29. Conversely, the addition 
of the interaction did not make a meaningful difference when added to the model, F(1, 148) = 
1.78, p = .185, ΔR2 = .01, which indicated a lack of moderation. 
 A third and final model was then conducted examining anchoring scores as a possible 
moderator at time 2. Results of this third model revealed that the overall model was significant 
with a small effect size, F(4, 148) = 4.05, p = .004, R2 = .10. The individual predictors were then 
examined and showed that there was a zero effect of false information on ATOP scores, b = 3.76, 
t(148) = 1.50, p = .136, β = .14. Similarly, anchoring scores did not predict ATOP scores in the 
model, b = 6.54, t(148) = 0.72, p = .473, β = .22. However, PRI scores once more were a 
significant covariate, b = 1.11, t(148) = 3.15, p = .002, β = .25. Conversely, the addition of the 
interaction did not make a meaningful difference when added to the model, F(1, 148) = 1.61, p = 
.206, ΔR2 = .01, which indicated a lack of moderation. 
Supplementary Analyses 
 Following the main analyses, a series of exploratory analyses were conducted to 
determine if participants’ explicit beliefs varied by demographic information. The first set of 
these analyses were used to determine if participants’ explicit beliefs towards weight, as 
measured by ATOP scores, varied by age, sex, ethnicity, or political affiliation at time 1 or at 
time 2. At time 1, a series of between subjects one-way ANCOVAs were conducted with PRI 




function of age, F(8, 143) = 1.40, p = .202, ηp² = .07, ethnicity, F(4, 147) = 1.14, p = .341, ηp² = 
.03, nor political affiliation, F(4, 147) = 0.94, p = .444, ηp² = .03. However, ATOP scores did 
differ by sex, F(1, 150) = 5.76, p = .018, ηp² = .04. Specifically, female participants, n = 87, M = 
66.62, SD = 12.25, displayed more positive attitudes towards obese persons than did male 
participants, n = 66, M = 60.65, SD = 12.54.  
 Following the series of ANCOVAs conducted at time 1, the procedure was then repeated 
using ATOP scores from time 2. Similarly, the results showed that explicit beliefs towards 
weight as measured by the ATOP scale did not differ as a function of age, F(8, 143) = 1.30, p = 
.249, ηp² = .07, ethnicity, F(4, 147) = 0.90, p = .467, ηp² = .02, nor political affiliation, F(4, 147) 
= 0.90, p = .466, ηp² = .02. However, ATOP scores once again differed by sex, F(1, 150) = 
14.14, p < .001, ηp² = .09. Specifically, female participants, n = 87, M = 69.36, SD = 13.69, 
continued to display more positive attitudes towards obese persons than did male participants, n 
= 66, M = 60.26, SD = 12.55. 
 Based on the significant differences in explicit beliefs towards weight between males and 
females, two follow-up, dual moderation models were conducted (see Figure 5). Model 2 from 
the PROCESS program using 5000 bootstrapped samples was utilized (Hayes, 2013). Similar to 
the earlier moderation models, the false information condition (i.e., negative or positive 
correlation) was entered as the predictor variable with ATOP scores serving as the outcome 
variable. Response bias, as indicated by PRI scores, was again utilized as a covariate in the 
model. However, in these models both IAT scores and the sex of participants were used as 
moderator variables.  
 For time 1, the overall model was significant, F(6, 146) = 5.27, p < .001, R2 = .18, but 




interaction were both not significant, b = 1.63, t(146) = 0.42, p = .674, β = .15, which indicated a 
lack of moderation for sex at time 1. Meanwhile, IAT scores did predict ATOP scores in the 
model, b = 15.95, t(146) = 1.98, p = .049, β = .49, but the IAT by false information condition 
interaction was not significant, b = -6.02, t(146) = -1.22, p = .224, β = -.30, which indicated a 
lack of moderation for IAT scores at time 1. Results were similar for time 2 as the overall model 
was significant, F(6, 146) = 5.31, p < .001, R2 = .18, but sex, b = 6.56, t(146) = 0.98, p = .327, β 
= .23, and the sex by false information condition interaction were both not significant, b = 0.81, 
t(146) = 0.19, p = .848, β = .07, which indicated a lack of moderation for sex at time 2. 
Moreover, IAT scores did not predict ATOP scores, b = 8.07, t(146) = 0.91, p = .366, and the 
IAT by false information condition interaction was not significant, b = -0.66, t(146) = -0.12, p = 
.908, β = -.03, which indicated a lack of moderation for IAT scores at time 2.  
 Following an examination of the demographic variables, a final set of analyses were 
conducted to determine if moderation occurred with reference to the aggression-related item of 
the ATOP scale. As previously noted, the ATOP scale is a 20-item measure that assesses beliefs 
regarding obesity. However, the scale assesses overall beliefs whereas one item directly assesses 
beliefs on the link between obesity and aggression (i.e., “Obese people are often less aggressive 
than non-obese people”). Therefore, a set of analyses were conducted that replicated the 
previous models with the single aggression-related item serving as the dependent variable rather 
than overall ATOP scores.  
 The single aggression-related item did not significantly correlate with any of the 
demographic variables, ps > .05. Moreover, the single aggression-related item did not differ by 
participants’ implicit beliefs towards weight, sex, ethnicity, or political affiliation at time 1 or at 




both time 1, F(8, 144) = 2.05, p = .045, ηp² = .10, and at time 2, F(8, 144) = 2.27, p = .026, ηp² = 
.11. Two t-tests were then conducted to examine the effect of false information on the single 
aggression-related item. Results indicated that the false information conduction had a significant 
impact at time 1, t(151) = 1.98, p = .049, d = 0.32, but not at time 2, t(151) = -0.39, p = .698, d = 
0.06. 
 Based on the significant differences on the single aggression-related item towards weight 
by participant ages, two follow-up, moderation models were conducted (see Figure 6). Model 1 
from the PROCESS program using 5000 bootstrapped samples was utilized (Hayes, 2013). 
Similar to earlier models, the false information condition as the predictor variable with scores on 
the single aggression-related item serving as the outcome variable. Results at time 1 indicated 
that the overall model was not significant and had a small effect size, F(3, 149) = 2.06, p = .108, 
R2 = .04, with a zero effect of false information on the single aggression-related item, b = 2.45, 
t(149) = 0.88, p = .382, β = .87. Meanwhile, age did not predict scores on the single aggression-
related item in the model, b = 0.33, t(149) = 1.27, p = .207, β = .43. Similarly, the addition of the 
interaction did not make a meaningful difference when added to the model, F(1, 149) = 1.09, p = 
.299, ΔR2 = .01, which indicated a lack of moderation. 
 Meanwhile, Results at time 2 indicated that the overall model was not significant and had 
a small effect size, F(3, 149) = 0.37, p = .778, R2 = .01. The individual predictors were then 
assessed and revealed that there was a zero effect of false information on the single aggression-
related item, b = 2.22, t(149) = 0.77, p = .441, β = .78. Meanwhile, age did not predict scores on 
the single aggression-related item in the model, b = 0.24, t(149) = 0.87, p = .385, β = .30. 
Similarly, the addition of the interaction did not make a meaningful difference when added to the 






                      
 
Figure 1. Histogram showing results of the single assessment item of the dependent variable 
where responses of -3 indicated a strong negative correlation, 3 indicated a strong positive 









Figure 2. Moderation model examining the total effect of the weight/aggression correlation 
information, implicit weight beliefs, and the weight/aggression correlation information by 
implicit weight belief interaction on explicit weight beliefs with the tendency to respond in a 










Figure 3. Moderation model examining the total effect of the weight/aggression correlation 
information, confirmation bias, and the weight/aggression correlation information by 
confirmation bias interaction on explicit weight beliefs with the tendency to respond in a socially 









Figure 4. Moderation model examining the total effect of the weight/aggression correlation 
information, anchoring, and the weight/aggression correlation information by anchoring 
interaction on explicit weight beliefs with the tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner 









Figure 5. Dual moderation model examining the total effect of the weight/aggression correlation 
information, implicit weight beliefs, sex, the weight/aggression correlation information by 
implicit weight belief interaction, and the weight/aggression correlation information by sex on 
explicit weight beliefs with the tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner serving as a 









Figure 6. Moderation model examining the total effect of the weight/aggression correlation 
information, age, and the weight/aggression correlation information by age interaction on the 






Table 1  
Descriptive Data for Dependent Variables and Covariates by Experimental Condition (N = 153) 
Variable Negative Correlation Condition 
 Positive Correlation 
Condition 
 
ATOP Time 1   
M (SE) 62.59 (1.46)  65.48 (1.43)  
95% CI 59.69, 65.50  62.63, 68.33   
ATOP Time 2   
M (SE) 64.54 (1.66)  66.31 (1.52)  
95% CI 61.22, 67.85  63.28, 69.34  
Single Assessment Item  
M (SE) -0.09 (0.13)  0.48 (0.11)  
95% CI -0.34, 0.16  0.26, 0.70  
IAT Time 1   
M (SE) 0.03 (0.04)   -0.03 (0.05)  
95% CI -0.05, 0.12  -0.12, 0.06  
IAT Time 2   
M (SE) 0.01 (0.04)  -0.01 (0.04)  
95% CI -0.08, 0.10  -0.09, 0.07  
PRI     
M (SE) 6.59 (0.35)  6.27 (0.36)  
95% CI 5.90, 7.28  5.55, 6.99  
Body Mass Index     
M (SE) 23.74 (0.44)  24.07 (0.53)  
95% CI 22.87, 24.61  23.01, 25.12  
Desire to Lose Weight     
M (SE) 4.78 (0.33)  5.16 (0.38)  
95% CI 4.11, 5.44  4.40, 5.91  
Closed-Mindedness     
M (SE) 23.11 (0.59)  22.38 (0.56)  
95% CI 21.93, 24.28  21.26, 23.49  
Anchoring  
M (SE) 0.24 (0.04)  0.25 (0.07)  
95% CI 0.16, 0.32  0.12, 0.38  
ATOP = Attitudes Toward Obese Persons. 
IAT = Implicit Association Test.  







Table 2  
Correlations (N = 153) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Condition - .11 .06 .27** -.08 -.03 -.05 .04 .06 -.07 -.01 
2. ATOP Time 1  - .83** .00 .21** .25** .28** -.15 .04 -.23** -.17* 
3. ATOP Time 2   - -.11 .28** .19* .24** -.10 .09 -.15 -.16* 
4. SAI    - -.16* -.08 -.06 .04 .05 -.10 .13 
5. IAT Time 1     - .50** -.01 .11 .19* .00 .03 
6. IAT Time 2      - -.04 .12 .25** -.02 .10 
7. PRI       - .03 .15 -.31** -.01 
8. BMI        - .60** -.17* .16* 
9. DLW         - -.20* .18* 
10. CM          - -.02 
11. Anchoring           - 
M 1.-0…      .64.05…...65.43… m..0.20.. -0.00   0.00         6.43           23.90          4.97 22.74 0.25 
SD 0.-0…      12.68…..13.92…   m.1.06..     .0.39  0.37         3.08                4.25            3.11 5.03 0.48 
Min.  -        35       29        -2 -1.28. -1.34     0 16.01     1 9 0 
Max.  -        95       99     3 0.58.  0.42    13 39.64    10 37 4.38 
Note. Condition coded as: Negative Correlation = 1; Positive Correlation = 2. 
ATOP = Attitudes Toward Obese Persons. 
SAI = Single Assessment Item. 
IAT = Implicit Association Test. 
PRI = Personal Reaction Inventory. 
BMI = Body Mass Index 
DLW = Desire to Lose Weight. 
CM = Closed-Mindedness. 






   
Table 3  
Correlations by Negative Correlation (N = 76) and Positive Correlation (N = 77) Conditions 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Negative Correlation 
  1. ATOP Time 1 - .84** -.03 .30** .22 .35** -.13 .08 -.36** -.01 
  2. ATOP Time 2  - -.13 .35** .15 .29* -.09 .12 -.23 -.01 
  3. SAI  - -.08 -.00 -.11 .10 .12 -.09 .08 
  4. IAT Time 1    - .45** -.02 .12 .20 .04 -.04 
  5. IAT Time 2     - -.19 .12 .25* .04 .06 
  6. PRI      - -.01 .10 -.33** -.05 
  7. BMI       - .55** -.09 .12 
  8. DLW        - -.10 .15 
  9. CM         - .12 
  10. Anchoring          - 
  M 62.59 64.54 -0.09 0.00 0.00 6.59 23.74 4.78 23.11 0.24 
  SD 12.72 14.51 1.09 0.37 0.38 3.01 3.81 2.91 5.13 0.36 
  Min. 35 29 -2 -1.19 -1.16 0 17.48 1 13 0 
  Max. 89 96 3 0.58 0.41 13 35.11 10 37 1.33 
 Positive Correlation 
  1. ATOP Time 1 - .83** -.04 .15* .29* .23* -.17 -.01 -.08 -.27* 
  2. ATOP Time 2  - -.14 .23* .25* .20 -.11 .-6 -.05 -.27* 
  3. SAI  - -.22 -.15 .02 -.04 -.05 -.07 .18 
  4. IAT Time 1    - .54** -.02 .12 .18 -.05 .07 
  5. IAT Time 2     - .10 .13 .27 -.09 .13 
  6. PRI      - ..07 .19 -.29** .01 
  7. BMI       - .64** -.24* .18 
  8. DLW        - -.27* .20 
  9. CM         - -.12 
  10. Anchoring          - 
  M 65.48 66.31 0.48 0.00 0.00 6.27 24.07 5.16 22.38 0.25 
  SD 12.56 13.36 0.95 0.41 0.36 3.17 4.66 3.31 4.93 0.57 
  Min. 38 36 -2 -1.28 -1.34 0 16.01 1 9 0 
  Max. 95 99 3 0.55 0.42 12 39.64 10 31 4.38 
ATOP = Attitudes Toward Obese Persons. 
SAI = Single Assessment Item. 
IAT = Implicit Association Test. 
PRI = Personal Reaction Inventory. 
BMI = Body Mass Index 
DLW = Desire to Lose Weight. 
CM = Closed-Mindedness. 





CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
 
 The central purposes of this study was to explore belief perseverance in the context of 
weight stigma, to assess the possible moderating effects of implicit beliefs towards weight, and 
to determine whether any such effects would persist beyond their initial conception. It was 
expected that providing participants with false information in opposing directions (i.e., a false 
negative or false positive correlation) would lead to a replication of belief perseverance effects in 
the context of weight stigma. Moreover, it was predicted that such effects would be moderated 
by the degree to which individuals have implicit bias towards those who are overweight and that 
both of these effects would still be present when measured at a 48 hour follow-up experimental 
session. There was evidence to support the replication of the belief perseverance effect as 
participants who received information about a false negative correlation between weight and 
aggression later rated the true correlation between weight and aggression as being more negative 
than participants who learned of a false positive correlation between weight and aggression. 
However, there was no support for any moderating effects of implicit beliefs let alone for the 
continuation of any such moderating effects. 
 A secondary aim of this research was to attempt to examine whether individual 
differences in cognitive biases would impact explicit beliefs following the presentation of false 
information. Specifically, the tendency to engage in confirmation bias and the anchoring 
heuristic. To measure their individual differences with respect to confirmation bias, participants 
completed the closed-mindedness subscale of the Need for Closure scale, which assessed the 
degree to which they struggle with having their knowledge or beliefs contradicted (Kruglanski et 
al., 1993). Meanwhile, the tendency to be overly influenced by an initial anchor was assessed 




Kahneman, 1974). The evidence seems to support the influence of individual differences with 
respect to cognitive biases as confirmation bias scores predicted explicit beliefs during the initial 
experimental session while anchoring scores predicted explicit beliefs at both the initial and 48 
hour follow-up sessions. However, at no point was there support for the presence of a 
moderating effect of confirmation bias nor anchoring. 
Belief Perseverance 
 Of particular importance to the current study was the cognitive bias of belief 
perseverance, which refers to the tendency for people maintain an initial beliefs even after the 
foundation for said belief has been discredited (Ross et al., 1975). Using the debriefing 
paradigm, participants were randomly assigned to learn of a consistent finding in the empirical 
literature. Specifically, that there was a strong negative, or strong positive, correlation between 
weight and aggression among young adults. Participants were later informed that this 
information was false before being asked to make a related judgment to determine whether the 
false information had been fully discredited or was still exerting some form of influence over 
their decision-making processes. 
 To examine for any belief perseverance effect in the clearest and most effective manner, 
a single assessment item pertaining directly to the dependent variable of interest was 
administered at the end of the 48 hour follow-up experimental session. That is, after all 
experimental procedures had been complete and participants had concluded with surveys 
administered at the initial session as well as at the 48 hour follow-up, they were asked to report 
what they believe the true correlation was between weight and aggression in young adults. This 




to the true nature of the experiment. However, it is likely that some participants were able to 
deduce the main purpose of the study prior to this point.  
 Analyses revealed support for a belief perseverance effect as those participants who 
received false information regarding a negative correlation between weight and aggression in 
young adults indicated that they believed the true correlation was more negative than participants 
who had been presented with false information of a positive correlation between weight and 
aggression. Using an entirely rational approach, participants should not have differed in their 
views as they should not have relied upon any discredited information to make their judgments. 
Yet, the results suggested that they did as their responses appear to have been influenced by 
which type of false information they had previously received.  
 Although this direct test of belief perseverance supported the initial hypothesis of this 
study, some may note that the false information condition did not lead to subsequent differences 
with respect to explicit beliefs towards weight as measured by the ATOP scale for the initial 
experimental session nor for the 48 hour follow-up session. However, it should be noted that the 
ATOP scale assesses how individuals view obese persons overall (see Appendix B). That is, it is 
not specifically focused on the relationship between weight and aggression. This is in contrast 
with the single assessment item, which directly addressed the dependent variable of interest. 
Therefore, despite the lack of a relationship between the type of false information presented and 
ATOP scores, the first hypothesis was supported as the belief perseverance effect was shown to 
replicate to views related to weight stigma 
Explicit and Implicit Beliefs 
 The second central aspect of this study was the possible role that implicit beliefs may 




explicit beliefs either due to a response bias or because their true beliefs are unknown even to 
themselves (Bargh, 1994). Therefore, a moderation analysis approach was utilized to examine 
the possible influence of implicit beliefs with respect to belief perseverance. This allowed for the 
assessment of how implicit beliefs impacted the relationship between the false information 
regarding the correlation between weight and aggression that was presented to participants and to 
the explicit beliefs towards weight that were reported.  
 Prior to an examination of the moderation models, correlations between variables were 
assessed, which showed that participants’ explicit and implicit beliefs were all correlated with 
one another (see Table 2). This indicates that the assessments appear to be related, which 
supports the likelihood that they are measuring the same underlying beliefs as intended. 
Moreover, the fact that correlations were significant not only between IAT scores for the initial 
and follow-up experimental sessions, but between IAT scores and ATOP scores suggests that the 
IAT did measure implicit beliefs regarding weight as intended. Additionally, IAT scores were 
shown to have predictive validity in predicting ATOP scores. These findings provide additional 
support for the IAT as a valid measurement tool despite the previously described shortcomings 
associated with the test. 
 Although the overall moderation model results for the initial experimental session were 
significant and IAT scores predicted ATOP scores, the interaction term between the 
experimental condition and IAT scores signified a lack of a moderation effect. This indicates that 
the second hypothesis, that implicit beliefs would moderate the impact of explicit beliefs with 
respect to belief perseverance, was not supported. A similar pattern of results was discovered for 




that the fourth hypothesis, that any moderation effects would persist beyond their initial 
conception, was similarly not supported.  
 The lack of moderation effects due to implicit beliefs may suggest that such beliefs do 
not influence belief perseverance. However, they may also be a result of the measures 
themselves. As previously noted, the ATOP scale assesses how individuals view obese persons 
overall. In fact, the ATOP scale only contains a single item related to aggression. This is in 
contrast to the aims and nature of the false information used in this study. Considering that the 
focal point of this study was the link between weight and aggression in young adults, it is 
possible that a more relevant scale would have been more prudent and could have produced 
differing results.  
Cognitive Biases and Heuristics 
 Psychology has long highlighted the imperfections of human perception as researchers in 
this domain have found evidence that people’s goals, needs, and expectations influence how they 
perceive the world around them (Erdelyi, 1974). As such, several possible cognitive biases were 
discussed as having the potential to contribute to the belief perseverance effect. Although 
numerous such biases had the potential to influence how individuals perceive information, five 
were singled out as being particularly relevant to the current study. Confirmation bias, anchoring 
and adjusting, cognitive dissonance, the availability heuristic, and the tendency for people to act 
as cognitive misers were all discussed as being plausibly relevant. Moreover, it is an established 
practice in psychology to examine individual differences alongside the assessment of group-level 
variables. Therefore, in addition to examining belief perseverance and the possible moderating 
effects of implicit beliefs, the tendency to engage in confirmation bias, anchoring, and how such 




 As previously described, confirmation bias and anchoring were two biases thought to be 
particularly relevant to the present study. Confirmation bias is one of the most prevalent biases as 
people often seek ways to support what they already believe while being cautious or avoidant of 
any new information that contradicts their beliefs (Wason, 1960). Inclinations to seek out, more 
easily recall, and interpret new information in a biased manner, are all behaviors that may 
contribute to belief perseverance. For the current study, it was posited that those with pre-
existing negative beliefs towards overweight individuals may more easily recall the false 
information when it aligned with their initial beliefs (i.e., that there is a positive correlation 
between weight and aggression) despite being informed of its lack of veracity. Similarly, it was 
believed that anchoring, whereby individuals make estimates based on an initial value or anchor, 
may also be particularly applicable to the current study. Prior to analyses, it was thought that 
when participants received contradictory information relating to the link between weight and 
aggression that they may adjust their beliefs insufficiently and thereby give undue influence to 
the initial anchor.  
 Based on the pervasiveness and relevance of these biases, regression models were 
conducted to determine if individual differences in such biases predicted explicit beliefs. Three 
of the four models found that such differences did predict explicit beliefs. This indicated that for 
participants in the current study, their individual tendency to fall prey to cognitive biases often 
predicted their reported attitudes towards obese persons. However, subsequent analyses indicated 
that such individual differences among participants did not moderate the relationship between the 
experimental condition and explicit beliefs. Taken together, these findings indicate that although 
individual differences in cognitive biases were related enough to predict explicit beliefs, that they 




 Despite the lack of moderation, and therefore lack of support for the third hypothesis, the 
present findings for individual differences in cognitive biases points towards the importance of 
including assessments of individual-level differences in psychological research. It is worth 
noting that numerous cognitive biases exist that may have pertained to the current study. 
Although five such biases were described earlier, only two of these were assessed and 
implemented. Given the plethora of cognitive biases that could potentially impact empirical 
results, researchers would be wise to assess, and if necessary control for, such biases in future 
research.  
Limitations 
 A number of limitations of this research require discussion. First, participants in the study 
consisted entirely of university students. This is a common critique of numerous empirical 
studies, but it is worth mentioning in this context. As the main manipulation was directly 
relevant to students (i.e., the positive or negative correlation between weight and aggression in 
young adults), it is possible that students may have been disinclined to believe such information 
from the start. That is, they have been especially knowledgeable of the proposed false 
relationship based on their personal knowledge of their own cohort. Additionally, one of the 
limitations of the implicit association test is that experience with the test itself can impact 
subsequent results and students taking part in psychology studies on a university campus are 
likely to have past experience completing such measures. Moreover, the relative erudition of the 
participants in the sample may also have led to them displaying a greater degree of cognitive 





 A second limitation was the nature of the dependent variables. First, the core question of 
whether belief perseverance had replicated to views related to weight was measured with a single 
item. This is potentially problematic as using a single item measure comes with the burden of 
reduced sensitivity and lacks any form of internal consistency. Second, the Attitudes Toward 
Obese Persons scale used as the main dependent variable in all subsequent analyses measures 
general views towards those individuals who are overweight rather than the specific link between 
weight and aggression. Therefore, this measure may have lacked the specificity necessary given 
the experimental manipulation implemented in this study.  
 A third limitation were the measures used to assess individual differences in cognitive 
biases. With regards to the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, no known measure of individual 
differences is present in the current literature. Therefore, a task based upon the initial anchoring 
article was utilized and paired with a relatively novel calculation for assessing individual 
differences. Moreover, anchoring was measured using a single task, which comes with a number 
of concerns previously described. Meanwhile, the closed-mindedness subscale of the Need for 
Closure scale was used as a proxy for assessing confirmation bias. Although the items in the 
subscale have face validity (e.g., “I do not usually consult many different options before forming 
my own view”), the subscale was not created for the purpose of assessing confirmation bias. 
Therefore, it remains uncertain whether confirmation bias was truly measured or whether some 
other related latent variable was assessed instead. 
 A final limitation is that which is most apparent: the severe lack of statistical power due 
to a woefully inadequate sample size. Initial sample size estimates suggested a minimum sample 
size of 257 participants would be required. However, by early spring of 2020 the coronavirus 




strain led to the closure of all colleges and universities in the United States. Due to this closure, 
data collection was unexpectedly terminated two months earlier than anticipated. 
 Due to the survey nature of the experimental procedure, some may question why data 
collection for this study was not moved online following the outbreak of COVID-19. The present 
study was conducted entirely through an electronic survey, yet was carried out within an 
experimental research laboratory. This extra precaution was implemented in an attempt to avoid 
random responding and to ensure consistency between participants by means of environmental 
distractions. Moreover, it provided the assurance that the surveys at time 1 and time 2 had been 
completed exactly 48 hours apart. Additionally, there was a concern that the COVID-19 
pandemic would increase ingroup salience as well as distrust for outgroup members. This was a 
concern as the majority of participants in the present study were in the normal BMI range, which 
thereby made overweight people an outgroup.  
Future Research 
 As previously mentioned, there were several limitations in the current study that should 
be addressed in future research. First, a more generalizable sample should be utilized so as to 
avoid any relevant concerns regarding the usage of an all-student sample. Students may be at a 
unique advantage as they differ substantially from the general population in terms of their 
knowledge, cognitive flexibility, and familiarity with the implicit association test. Second, 
researchers should endeavor to use dependent measures consisting of more than a single item and 
ensure that any scales used have been created and validated for the intended purposes of the 
variables and relationships under examination. 
 A third recommendation is for the continued and expanded assessment of individual 




but it is key that scales and assessment tasks be created and validated for the specific cognitive 
biases of interest. Finally, moderation analyses should be conducted using the proper sample size 
to ensure statistical power and confidence in any findings. Although this study found no 
moderation effects, it is uncertain as to whether this is a result of the absence of such effects or 
the mere inability to detect their presence due to a lack of statistical power.  
Conclusion 
 The present study utilized a theoretical approach in an effort to further the literature on 
belief perseverance. An overall belief perseverance effect was found, which expanded upon the 
various topic areas shown to lead to belief perseverance. Additionally, it was found that 
individuals’ tendency to fall prey to cognitive biases predicted their explicit beliefs towards 
weight and that there were unexpected differences in explicit beliefs between the sexes as well as 
by age. However, no effects of moderation were detected and, due to several limitations, the 
findings of this study are far from conclusive. Future research should endeavor to examine the 
moderating effects of implicit beliefs with regards to belief perseverance while obtaining the 
necessary statistical power. Moreover, future studies should examine individual differences in 






Allison, D. B. (1995). Handbook of assessment methods for eating behaviors and weight-related 
problems. Measures, theory, and research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
 
Allison, D. B., Basile, V. C., & Yuker, H. E. (1991). The Measurement of Attitudes Toward and 
Beliefs About Obese Persons. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 10, 599-
607. doi:10.1002/1098-108X(199109)10:5<599::AID-EAT2260100512>3.0.CO2-23 
 
Anderson, C. A. (1983). Abstract and concrete data in the perseverance of social theories: When 
weak data lead to unshakeable beliefs. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 
93-108. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(83)90031-8 
  
Anderson, C.A. (2007). Belief perseverance (pp. 109-110). In R. F. Baumeister & K. D. Vohs 
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of Social Psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
  
Anderson, C. A., Lepper, M. R., & Ross, L. (1980). Perseverance of social theories: The role of 
explanation in the persistence of discredited information. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 39, 1037-1049. doi:10.1037/h0077720 
 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and 
control in social cognition. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social 
cognition (pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
 
Baron, A. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). The development of implicit attitudes: Evidence of race 
evaluations from ages 6 and 10 and adulthood. Psychological Science, 17, 53-58. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01664.x 
 
Beretvas, S. N., Meyers, J. L., & Leite, W. L. (2002). A reliability generalization study of the 
Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 
62, 570-589. doi:10.1177/0013164402062004003  
 
Blumer, H. (1955). Attitudes and the social act. Social Problems, 3, 59-65. doi:10.2307/798705 
 
Bruner, J. (1992). Another look at new look 1. American Psychologist, 47, 780-783. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.47.6.780 
 
Bruner, J. S., & Goodman, C. C. (1947). Value and need as organizing factors in perception. The 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 42, 33-44. doi:10.1037/h0058484 
 
Bruner, J. S., & Postman, L. (1947). Tension and tension-release as organizing factors in 
perception. Personality, 15, 300-308. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1947.tb01070.x 
 
Bui, N. H. (2014). I don’t believe it! Belief perseverance in attitudes toward celebrities. 





Carpenter, T. P., Pogacar, R., Pullig, C., Kouril, M., Aguilar, S., . . . Chakroff, A. (2018). 
Conducting IAT research within online surveys: A procedure, validation, and open 
source tool. PsyArXiv. doi:10.31234/osf.io/hgy3z 
 
Carretta, T. R., & Moreland, R. L. (1982). Nixon and Watergate: A field demonstration of belief 
perseverance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8, 446-453. 
doi:10.1177/014616728083010 
 
Cervone, D., & Palmer, B. W. (1990). Anchoring biases and the perseverance of self-efficacy 
beliefs. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 14, 401-416. doi:10.1007/BF01172935 
 
Charlesworth, T. E. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2019). Patterns of implicit and explicit attitudes: I. long-
term change and stability from 2007 to 2016. Psychological Science, 30, 174-192. 
doi:10.1177/0956797618813087 
 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Earlbaum Associates. 
 
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155-159. 
 
Credé, M. (2010). Random responding as a threat to the validity of effect size estimates in 
correlational research. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 70, 596-612. 
doi:10.1177/0013164410366686 
 
Cronbach, L. J. (1978). The two disciplines of scientific psychology. In E. R. Hilgard 
(Ed.), American psychology in historical perspective (pp. 435-458). American 
Psychological Association, Washington, DC. doi:10.1037/10049-022  
 
Cronbach, L. J., & Furby, L. (1970). How we should measure "change": Or should 
we? Psychological Bulletin, 74, 68-80. doi:10.1037/h0029382 
 
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of 
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349-354. doi:10.1037/h0047358 
 
Darrat, A. A. (2017). Examining consumers’ cognitive and behavioral responses to belief 
disconfirmation. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, 
LA. 
 
de Onis, M., Garza, C., Onyango, A. W., & Martorell, R. (2006). WHO child growth standards 
based on length/height, weight and age. Acta Pædiatrica, 95, 3-101. 
doi:10.1080/08035320500495548  
 
Dedeli, O., Bursalioglu, S. A., & Deveci, A. (2014). Validity and reliability of the Turkish 
version of the attitudes toward obese persons scale and the beliefs about obese persons 





Erdelyi, M. H. (1974). A new look at the new look: Perceptual defense and vigilance. 
Psychological Review, 81, 1-25. doi:10.1037/h0035852 
 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G., & Buchner, A. (2007). GPower 3: A flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 39, 175–191. doi:10.3758/BF03193146 
 
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: The MODE model as 
an integrative framework. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 75–109.  
 Doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60318-4 
 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Festinger, L. (1964). Behavioral support for opinion change. Public Opinion Quarterly, 28, 404-
417. doi:10.1086/267263 
 
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. The 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203-210. doi:10.1037/h0041593 
 
Fishbein, M., & Raven, B. H. (1962). The AB scales: An operational definition of belief and 
attitude. Human Relations, 15, 35-44. doi:10.1177/001872676201500104 
 
Fiske, S, T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social cognition. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
 
Gattol, V., Sääksjärvi, M., & Claus-Christian, C. (2011). Extending the implicit association test 
(IAT): Assessing consumer attitudes based on multi-dimensional implicit 
associations. PLoS One, 6. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015849 
 
Gawronski, B., & Creighton, L. A. (2013). Dual process theories. In D. E. Carlston (Ed.), The 
Oxford handbook of social cognition (pp. 282-312). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Glashouwer, K. A., Bennik, E. C., de Jong, P. J., & Spruyt, A. (2018). Implicit measures of 
actual versus ideal body image: Relations with self-reported body dissatisfaction and 
dieting behaviors. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 42, 622-635. doi:10.1007/s10608-
018-9917-6 
 
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall.  
 
Gómez-López M., Manzano-Sánchez, D., Merino-Barrero, J. A., & Valero-Valenzuela, A. 
(2019). The importance of the coach in predicting implicit beliefs about skill and beliefs 
about the causes of success in handball players. International Journal of Environmental 





Goulding, L., Furze, G., & Birks, Y. (2010). Randomized controlled trials of interventions to 
change maladaptive illness beliefs in people with coronary heart disease: Systematic 
review. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 66, 946-961. doi:10.1111/j.1365-
2648.2010.05306.x 
 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and 
stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4-27. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.102.1.4 
 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464 
 
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the implicit 
association test: I. an improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85, 197-216. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.197 
 
Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding and 
using the implicit association test: III. meta-analysis of predictive validity. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 17-41. doi:10.1037/a0015575 
 
Griffiths, K. M., Batterham, P. J., Barney, L., & Parsons, A. (2011). The generalised anxiety 
stigma scale (GASS): Psychometric properties in a community sample. BMC 
Psychiatry, 11, 1-9. doi:10.1186/1471-244X-11-184 
 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A 
regression-based approach. New York, NY: The Guildford Press. 
 
Heider, N., Spruyt, A., & De Houwer, J. (2018). Body dissatisfaction revisited: On the 
importance of implicit beliefs about actual and ideal body image. Psychologica 
Belgica, 57, 16. doi:10.5334/pb.362 
 
Hutchison, S. M., & Müller, U. (2018). Explicit and implicit measures of weight stigma in young 
children. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 64, 427-458. 
doi:10.13110/merrpalmquar1982.64.4.0427 
  
Johnson, T. P., Fendrich, M., & Mackesy-Amiti, M. E. (2012). An evaluation of the validity of 
the Crowne-Marlowe need for approval scale. Quality & Quantity: International Journal 
of Methodology, 46, 1883-1896. doi:10.1007/s11135-011-9563-5  
 
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. 
American Psychologist, 58, 697–720. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.697 
 
Kanter, J. W., Rusch, L. C., & Brondino, M. J. (2008). Depression self-stigma: A new measure 






Kim, E., Lee, K., Hwang, K., Kim, J. S., & Park, T. (2010). Reliability and validity of Korean 
version of questionnaire for weight bias measurement. Korean Journal of Family 
Medicine, 31, 461-471. doi:10.4082/kjfm.2010.31.6.461.  
 
Kunda, Z., & Sanitioso, R. (1989). Motivated changes in the self-concept. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 272-285. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(89)90023-1 
 
Kruglanski, A. W., Webster, D. M., & Klem, A. (1993). Motivated resistance and openness to 
persuasion in the presence or absence of prior information. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 65, 861-876. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.5.861 
 
Lacroix, E., Alberga, A., Russell-Mathew, S., McLaren, L., & von Ranson, K. (2017). Weight 
Bias: A Systematic Review of Characteristics and Psychometric Properties of Self-Report 
Questionnaires. Obesity facts, 10, 223–237. doi:10.1159/000475716 
 
Leaper, J. (2003). The development and expression of implicit attitudes. (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation). University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK. 
 
Lee, D. J. (2018). Does implicit bias predict dictator giving? Games, 9, 1-19. 
doi:10.3390/g9040073 
 
Leite, W. L. & Beretvas, S. N. (2005). Validation of scores on the Marlowe-Crowne social 
desirability scale and the balanced inventory of desirable responding. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 65, 140-154. doi:10.1177/0013164404267285  
 
Leone, C., Wallace, H. M., & Modglin, K. (1999). The need for closure and the need for 
structure: Interrelationships, correlates, and outcomes. The Journal of Psychology: 
Interdisciplinary and Applied, 133, 553-562. doi:10.1080/00223989909599762 
 
Lingiardi, V., Baiocco, R., & Nardelli, N. (2012). Measure of internalized sexual stigma for 
lesbians and gay men: A new scale. Journal of Homosexuality, 59, 1191-1210. 
doi:10.1080/00918369.2012.712850 
 
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The 
effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 37, 2098-2109. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.2098 
 
Lydecker, J. A., O'Brien, E., & Grilo, C. M. (2018). Parents have both implicit and explicit 
biases against children with obesity. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 41, 784-791. 
doi:10.1007/s10865-018-9929-4 
  
Major, B., Eliezer, D., & Rieck, H. (2012). The psychological weight of weight stigma. Social 
Psychological and Personality Science, 3, 651-658. doi:10.1177/1948550611434400 
 
Melnikoff, D. E., & Bargh, J. A. (2018). The mythical number two. Trends in Cognitive 





Mensinger, J. L., & Meadows, A. (2017). Internalized weight stigma mediates and moderates 
physical activity outcomes during a healthy living program for women with high body 
mass index. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 30, 64-72. 
doi:10.1016/j.psychsport.2017.01.010 
 
More, C., Madon, S., Guyll, M., & Atkinson, D. (2016, March). Does Belief Perseverance 
Explain the Power of Confession Evidence? Poster presented at American Psychology-
Law Society Conference, Atlanta, Georgia. 
 
More, C., Madon, S., Guyll, M., & Ditchfield, R. E. (2018, March). Decision making under 
uncertainty: Confession power and the role of belief perseverance. Poster presented at 
the American Psychology-Law Society Conference, Memphis, TN.  
 
Muschalik, C., Elfeddali, I., Candel, M. J. J. M., & de Vries, H. (2018). A longitudinal study on 
how implicit attitudes and explicit cognitions synergistically influence physical activity 
intention and behavior. BMC Psychology, 6, 1-13. doi:10.1186/s40359-018-0229-0  
 
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2004). Reducing the influence of extrapersonal associations on the 
implicit association test: Personalizing the IAT. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 86, 653-667. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.5.653 
  
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 123–205. doi:10.1016/S0065-
2601(08)60214-2 
 
Phelan, S. M., Burgess, D. J., Yeazel, M. W., Hellerstedt, W. L., Griffin, J. M., & van Ryn, M. 
(2015). Impact of weight bias and stigma on quality of care and outcomes for patients 
with obesity. Obesity Reviews, 16, 319-326. doi:10.1111/obr.12266 
 
Rae, J. R., & Olson, K. R. (2018). Test-retest reliability and predictive validity of the Implicit 
Association Test in children. Developmental Psychology, 54, 308-330. 
doi:10.1037/dev0000437 
 
Rassin, E. (2008). Individual differences in the susceptibility to confirmation bias. Netherlands 
Journal of Psychology, 64, 87-93. doi:10.1007/BF03076410 
 
Richardson, S. A., Goodman, N., Hastorf, A. H., & Dornbusch, S. M. (1961). Cultural 
uniformity in reaction to physical disabilities. American Sociological Review, 26, 241-
247. doi:10.2307/2089861 
 
Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., & Hubbard, M. (1975). Perseverance in self-perception and social 
perception: Biased attributional processes in the debriefing paradigm. Journal of 






Ruhe, C. (2018). Quantifying change over time: Interpreting time-varying effects in duration 
analyses. Political Analysis, 26, 90-111. doi:10.1017/pan.2017.35 
 
Schvey, N. A., Puhl, R. M., & Brown, K. D. (2011). The impact of weight stigma on caloric 
consumption. Obesity, 19, 1957-1962. doi:10.1038/oby.2011.204 
 
Skinner, B. F. (1948). “Superstition” in the pigeon. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38, 
168-172. doi:10.1037/h0055873 
 
Snyder, M., & Cantor, N. (1979). Testing hypotheses about other people: The use of historical 
knowledge. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15, 330-342. doi:10.1016/0022-
1031(79)90042-8 
 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008). On the relative independence of thinking biases and 
cognitive ability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 672-695. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 
 
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-247. 
doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1 
 
Teovanović, P., Knežević, G., & Stankov, L. (2015). Individual differences in cognitive biases: 
Evidence against one-factor theory of rationality. Intelligence, 50, 75-86. 
doi:10.1016/j.intell.2015.02.008 
 
Tomiyama, A. J. (2019). Stress and obesity. Annual Review of Psychology, 70, 703-718. 
doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010418-102936 
 
Tomiyama, A. J., Carr, D., Granberg, E. M., Major, B., Robinson, E., Sutin, A. R., & Brewis, A. 
(2018). How and why weight stigma drives the obesity ‘epidemic’ and harms health’ 
BMC Medicine, 16, 1-6. doi:10.1186/s12916-018-1116-5 
 
Tsai, M., Strong, C., Latner, J. D., Lin, Y., Pakpour, A. H., Lin, C., & Wang, S. (2019). Attitudes 
toward and beliefs about obese persons across Hong Kong and Taiwan: Wording effects 
and measurement invariance. Health and Quality of Life Outcomes, 17, 1-11. 
doi:10.1186/s12955-019-1198-6 
 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and 
probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-232. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 
 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131. doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 
 
Vartanian, L. R., & Novak, S. A. (2011). Internalized societal attitudes moderate the impact of 





Vartanian, L. R., Pinkus, R. T., & Smyth, J. M. (2014). The phenomenology of weight stigma in 
everyday life. Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science, 3, 196-202. 
doi:10.1016/j.jcbs.2014.01.003 
 
Vartanian, L. R., Pinkus, R. T., & Smyth, J. M. (2018). Experiences of weight stigma in 
everyday life: Implications for health motivation. Stigma and Health, 3, 85-92. 
doi:10.1037/sah0000077 
 
Verardi, S., Dahourou, D., Ah-Kion, J., Bhown, U., Tseung, C. N., Amoussou-Yeye, D., . . . 
Rossier, J. (2010). Psychometric properties of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability 
scale in eight African countries and Switzerland. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 
41, 19-34. doi:10.1177/0022022109348918  
 
Wason, P. C. (1960). On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 129-140. doi:10.1080/17470216008416717 
 
Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive 
closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1049-1062. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.67.6.1049 
 
Wu, Y., & Berry, D. C. (2018). Impact of weight stigma on physiological and psychological 
health outcomes for overweight and obese adults: A systematic review. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 74, 1030-1042. doi:10.1111/jan.13511 
 
Zdrok, V. A. (2003). The effect of judicial instructions on jury consideration of defendant’s 







APPENDIX A. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FORM 







Date:  12/06/2019 
 
To: Curt More, Leigh A Phillips 
 
From: Office for Responsible Research  
 
Title: A New Look at Attitudes and Beliefs 
 
IRB ID: 19-572 
 
Submission Type:  Initial Submission  Review Type: Expedited 
 
Approval Date:  12/06/2019   Approval Expiration Date:  N/A 
 
 
The project referenced above has received approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Iowa State 
University according to the dates shown above. Please refer to the IRB ID number shown above in all 
correspondence regarding this study. 
 
To ensure compliance with federal regulations (45 CFR 46 & 21 CFR 56), please be sure to: 
 
• Use only the approved study materials in your research, including the recruitment materials and informed 
consent documents that have the IRB approval stamp. 
 
• Retain signed informed consent documents for 3 years after the close of the study, when documented 
consent is required. 
 
• Obtain IRB approval prior to implementing any changes to the study or study materials. 
 
• Promptly inform the IRB of any addition of or change in federal funding for this study. Approval of the 
protocol referenced above applies only to funding sources that are specifically identified in the corresponding 
IRB application.  
 
• Inform the IRB if the Principal Investigator and/or Supervising Investigator end their role or involvement 
with the project with sufficient time to allow an alternate PI/Supervising Investigator to assume oversight 
responsibility. Projects must have an eligible PI to remain open. 
 
• Immediately inform the IRB of (1) all serious and/or unexpected adverse experiences involving risks to 
subjects or others; and (2) any other unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others. 
 
• IRB approval means that you have met the requirements of federal regulations and ISU policies governing 
human subjects research. Approval from other entities may also be needed. For example, access to data from 
private records (e.g., student, medical, or employment records, etc.) that are protected by FERPA, HIPAA, or 
other confidentiality policies requires permission from the holders of those records.  Similarly, for research 
conducted in institutions other than ISU (e.g., schools, other colleges or universities, medical facilities, 
companies, etc.), investigators must obtain permission from the institution(s) as required by their policies. IRB 
approval in no way implies or guarantees that permission from these other entities will be granted. 
Institutional Review Board 
Office for Responsible Research 
Vice President for Research  
2420 Lincoln Way, Suite 202 
Ames, Iowa 50014 
515 294-4566 





• Your research study may be subject to post-approval monitoring by Iowa State University’s Office for 
Responsible Research. In some cases, it may also be subject to formal audit or inspection by federal agencies 
and study sponsors. 
 
• Upon completion of the project, transfer of IRB oversight to another IRB, or departure of the PI and/or 
Supervising Investigator, please initiate a Project Closure to officially close the project. For information on 
instances when a study may be closed, please refer to the IRB Study Closure Policy.     
 
If your study requires continuing review, indicated by a specific Approval Expiration Date above, you should: 
 
• Stop all human subjects research activity if IRB approval lapses, unless continuation is necessary to prevent 
harm to research participants. Human subjects research activity can resume once IRB approval is re-established. 
 
• Submit an application for Continuing Review at least three to four weeks prior to the Approval Expiration 
Date as noted above to provide sufficient time for the IRB to review and approve continuation of the study. We 
will send a courtesy reminder as this date approaches. 
 






APPENDIX B. ATTITUDES TOWARD OBESE PERSONS SCALE 
 
Please mark each statement below in the left margin, according to how much you agree or 
disagree with it. Please do not leave any blank. Use the numbers on the following scale to 
indicate your response. Be sure to place a minus or plus sign ( - or +) beside the number that you 





















   1. ______ Obese people are as happy as non-obese people.  
   *2. ______ Most obese people feel that they are not as good as other people.  
   *3. ______ Most obese people are more self-conscious than other people.  
   *4. ______ Obese workers cannot be as successful as other workers.  
   *5. ______ Most non-obese people would not want to marry anyone who is obese.  
   *6. ______ Severely obese people are usually untidy.  
   7. ______ Obese people are usually sociable.  
   8. ______ Most obese people are not dissatisfied with themselves.  
   9. ______ Obese people are just as self-confident as other people.  
   *10. ______ Most people feel uncomfortable when they associate with obese people.  
   *11. ______ Obese people are often less aggressive than non-obese people.  
   *12. ______ Most obese people have different personalities than non-obese people.  
   13. ______ Very few obese people are ashamed of their weight.  
   *14. ______ Most obese people resent normal weight people.  
   *15. ______ Obese people are more emotional than non-obese people.  
   *16. ______ Obese people should not expect to lead normal lives.  
   17. ______ Obese people are just as healthy as non-obese people.  
   18. ______ Obese people are just as sexually attractive as non-obese people.  
   19. ______ Obese people tend to have family problems.  
   20. ______ One of the worst things that could happen to a person would be for him/her to  







APPENDIX C. PERSONAL REACTION INVENTORY 
 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item 
and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you.  
 
 
*1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work. 
 True False 
*2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my own way. 
 True False 
*3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I 
thought too little of my ability. 
 
True False 
*4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people 
in authority even though I knew they were right. 
 
True False 
5. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 
 True False 
*6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
 True False 
7. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
 True False 
*8. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget. 
 True False 
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
 True False 
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very 
different from my own. 
 
True False 
*11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good 
fortune of others. 
 
True False 
*12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
 True False 











APPENDIX D. CLOSED-MINDEDNESS SCALE 
 
"Attitude, Belief and Experience Survey" 
 
Instructions: Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each 























*1. Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a  
different opinion.  
 
2. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.  
 
3. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.  
 
*4. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be right.  
 
*5. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as 
possible.  
 
*6. I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own.  
 
*7. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. 
 
8. I do not usually consult many different options before forming my own view. 
 
 
*Reverse-scored items. 
